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TI-IIS  PAPER REWRTS  on  one Season of  research  in  a newly  commissioned 
irrigation system,  theKirindiOyaInigation  andSetrlementProject,in southern 
Sri  Lanka. The work  was carried  out by a research officer trained in the social 
sciences, supervised  by  a social scientist  on  the senior  staff of IIMl. The  paper 
is therefore not an  interdisciplinary  study, and does not claim to be a complete 
report  on all aspects  of irrigation system performance. For example, we have 
no reliable measures of actual water deliveries, which would be  required to 
evaluate the actual performance of the system. 
The season of the study, maha (wet season) 198411987, was also a very 
unusual and  unfortunate one for the farmers. Mahais normally the wet season, 
with heavy rains expected during the fmt half of  the season,  which runs horn 
about October/November  to MarcWApril.  However, in much of the country, 
including southern Sri Lanka, the rains failed, or were way below normal for 
the season. As  the managers of  the Kirindi Oya system had chosen to start the 
season with a low reservoir,  on the assumption that normal rains would come 
later, this severe drought led to a disaster for the cultivators. On much of the 
newly settled part of the system, the crop completdy failed. 
This faiIure could potentially have a severe impact on the confidence of  the 
cultivators in the system,  since most were cultivating for only the second or 
even first time (the previous dry  season, yala 1986, had been  the fttst season of 
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water issum in the  new settlement areas).  At tbe beginning of the se8son. we 
were documenting the management capacity at the level both of the newly 
esrabhhed farmers' organizatim and of  the various government agencies 
involved in the  project. There were clearly some serious problems at all  levels, 
with pmx  commdcahon between agency officials and  fanners,  and  among 
officials, conflicts among both farmers and some agency officials, weak 
,  and  poor cxwdhuion  at ali levels emeq$ng very clearly.  farmers' olganuaaons 
With  the reahation that the  resetvOir wdd  not  fill up,  and  that most 
settlers* crops  would fail, even mom serious institutional problems emerged. 
For the settlers the crop €dm  brought disaster: loss of their invesunent, loss 
of badly needed income, poverty, hunger,  hopelessness, and anger. Rightly  or 
wrongly, many blamed the government agencies for ihe disaster. Many were 
forced to leave the area and return to their home villages to  sUnive. Some 
government officials blamed others, perhaps to deflect any blame that would 
have been  directed at themselves. 
This report documents a range of  views, observations, perceptions, and 
accusationsof various people, incIudingfmersand  their leaders,  and  officials. 
In somecstsesthecriticismsexpressedbyourinfonnantsmay  appear somewhat 
extreme (the most  severe criticisms and accusations have in fact not been 
included here).  The authors do not endorse anypmticulcu accusasions and 
nothing in lhis report should be mistah  as  criticisms of individuals. 
As social scientists,  our focus is on the organizations through which people 
manage the system, at  both the government and farmer levels. It is very clear 
hm  our study that dlning the planning and  construction phase of the project, 
too  little attention was paid to  developing the management system required for 
effective operation of the system.  We make this statement even though we 
re&z  that the Kirindi Oya Irrigation and  Settlement Project was intended to 
be innovative in terms of settlement  and  management policy. These  problems 
have bn  major factors complicating  further the various start-up problems one 
normally expects when initiating a nav  irrigation system. 
The purpose of documenting the problems at Kirindi Oya is not M cast 
blame, but to  identify the problems that need  to  be  adbssed  if the project is 
going  to meet the high  expectations that settlers, donors, and government 
naturally hold.  We  do  not ch  to have all the answers.  IIMI  has initiated 
sevd,  wmplmsive,  research activities since thisstudy was completed, 
h'collabmation with the  relevant government agencies,  and with financial 
.. 
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suppolt from the Asian Development Bank  and  others. Thus  the  conclusians 
reached in this report should be understood as tentative, subject to ftrrther 
research; but preliminary results from this further work strongly support our 
conclusions. 
Based on the research in maha  1986/1987, plus what the more recent 
research data show, we do not hesitate in urging that farmore amtion  be  paid 
to strengthening the government agencies,  and the  cooper;ttion among  them at 
the project level, and that serious attention be  paid to  building smnger farmer 
organizations to  work  as partners  with  the government in managing  the 
irrigation system. The concluding chapter makes some  specific (tentative) 
suggestions in this regard. 
Despite the serious problems discussed  in this report, and the rather strong 
negative feelings generated among many seam  as a result of  the  failure of 
their crops, we are  confident that these problems can be overcome, and that the 
fanners and government officials can cooperate to develop the Kirindi Oya 
scheme to achieve its potential. 
Douglas J. Merrey 
Head, Sri Lmka Field Operations 
IIMI 
P,  G.  Somaratne 
Research  Oflcer 
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Executive Summary 
THIS  PAPER REPORTS on research carried out in the  Kirindi Oya Irrigation and 
SettIement Project, southern Sri Lanka, during one season, muha (wet season) 
1986/1987.  ThIs particular season the rains failed, causing a severe  drought, 
leading to crop failure in most of the newly settIed parts of  the scheme. The 
impact of this disaster was compounded by  the fact that this was a new scheme, 
and for farmers in the newly settled areas,  this was only the first or second 
cultivation season. We report in some detail the  seasonal  planning process,  the 
operation of the  irrigation season with  particular reference  to one  sample 
distributary, the organizational structure of  the Project at field and project 
levels, and the views expressed by  both farmers and officials of  the various 
departments. A first draft of the paper was sent to key officials for comments, 
and  we  have revised the  paper  based  on  the very  useful  suggestions we 
received. 
We analyze the irrigation operational problems that characterized the early 
part of the season,and attribute  them to certain organizational and management 
weaknesses.  We dso analyze the response of  the various institutions and 
participants in the system to the drought, and the  impact, particularly on  the 
credibility of  institutions. of  the drought and the way it was handled. We 
suggest that in addition to the real poverty, anger, feelings of helplessness, and 
general distress of  the new settlers, the drought further weakened the firagile 
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new farmers’ organizations,  and led to aloss  of faith in the official management 
organizations, and officials themselves. 
We identify a  number  of  specific organizational  weaknesses at  both 
farmers’ and project level which our observations suggest have contributed to 
the severe difficulties faced during this season. One reason for the problems 
identified is that the process of shifting from implementing  a construction and 
setdement project, to actually managing the new system to serve the farmer 
clients seems  not to have been as well managed as it might have been. 
This  report is  based on only one season of research. The results are therefore 
necessarily somewhat  tentative; but furtherresearch since maha 1986/1987 has 
tended to support the findings,  In the Conclusion, we therefore tentatively 
suggest some specific management innovations that may improve the development 
process and overal1 performance of the Project. Briefly, these  suggestions 
include: 
* Establish  clearer  lines  of  authority, including  one  senior  overall 
project manager, to eliminate the present fragmentation of  authority. 
*  Limit the function of the present Project Coordinating Committee to 
overseeing construction in Phase 11. 
*  Strengthen  the  Irrigation Management  Division-sponsored Project 
Committee, to  convert it into a “Kirindi  Oya hject  Management 
Committee,” as a vehicle for setting overall operational policy and as a 
forum for discussing and  solving  important  management  problems. 
The Committee should include farmers’  representatives  as  well  as 
highlevel government officials. 
*  Clarify and  strengthen the Irrigation Department’s mandate and capability 
for effective system management in partnership with  farmers’  groups, 
including  holding  regular  staff  meetings  to  improve  internal 
communications, and incentives and  training for better system management. 
*  Strengthen the role of the Irrigation Management Division through more 
participation by  its senior officials at Kirindi Oya Project meetings, and 
improved guidance and support for its Project Managers. 
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*  Use the resources for promoting and suengthening farmers’ organizations 
more effectively, by experimenting with using existing field staff from 
the Land Commissioner’s Department in the role of instituhnal  organizers, 
after providing effective training and guidance to them; and rectify 
anomalies  created by establishing  distributary organizations  on a hamlet 
basis. 
Successful development of a major irrigated scheme is a very complex and 
time-consuming process. Because Kirindi  Oya is a new scheme, it presents an 
opportunity to avoid problems found on older schemes by paying greater 
attention at this stage to developing effective institutions. We offer this study 
as a contribution toward achieving this objective. Chapter 1 
i 
Introduction 
Lm  DEVEU~PMEKT  IN  the dry zone through irrigated land settlement schemes 
has  been  the main rural development  strategy of the Government of Sri Lanka 
for over five decades.  Improving agricultural production, creating employment, 
settling people, and generating foreign exchange savings, the primary objectives 
of  such schemes, contribute to achieving the government's major economic 
and social goals. 
The Kirindi Oya Irrigation and  Settlement Project is a new major irrigation 
settlement scheme.  The main reservoir, Lunugamvehem, with an active 
storage  capacity of 210 million cubic meters' (Asian Development Bank 1986: 
Appendix 5),  was completed in 1985, and the first rice crop irrigated in 1986. 
Construction is still underway in parts of the system, The scheme is situated 
in the southern  dry  zone (southeast quadrant of the island) on the coastal main 
highway about 260 kilometers (km)  fromColombo. From Hambantota it starts 
midway on the Hambantota-Kamgama road  and  on the east on  the Wellawaya- 
Kataragama road.  The service area of the scheme falls within Hambantota 
District, while the dam  and the reservoir are located on the boundary of 
Hambantota and  Moneragala Districts (Figure 1). 
This paper is basedon research carried out in the Project during one season, 
mahu (wet season) 1986/1987. The 1986/1987 rains failed in this region of the 
country. Because the 1986 yaZa  (dry season) had been the  first season of 
operation on the newly settled lands of Kirindi Oya, farmers were cultivating 
for the first or second time.  Our field research  focused  on  a particular 
'A  sign m the office of the Resident Engineer (Headworks) gives an  active storage 
capacity of 160,500  acrefeet (198 million cubic maters), and dead storage capaciy 
of an additional 22,000 acre-feet (27 million cubic meters). 
1 Introduction  2 
figure I. Map of Kirindi Oya higation and Settlement Project 
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distributary channel located towards the tail of the area irrigated that season 
(although it will be a middle area when the scheme is completed).  The  work 
was carried out by one of  the authors, a Research Officer at IIMT,  under the 
supervision of the senior author. 
The research focused on the planning of the season,  and  the option  of the 
new irrigation system, as viewed by both farmers in the sample area,  and 
officials from various departments at field and middle levels of their agencies. 
Not surprisingly, since this is a new scheme. there were operational problems 
from the beginning.  These  are described and the organizational and management 
weaknesses underlying them are analyzed. About six weeks into the season, 
it became clear that  the anticipated rains had  failed, and the reservoir was 
emptying rapidly.  We  analyze the response of the various institutions and 
participants in the system to the drought,  and  the impact of the eventual crop 
failure.  The stresses created by the water shortages revealed rather starkly 
certain fundamental institutional weaknesses that need attention by higher- 
Ievel officials. The impact of the crop failure was disaster  -- in the short term, 
at least, further impoverishment of already rather poor SettIerS; and  in the long 
run,apotentiailossoffaithin  theinstitutionsandofficialsthat  willmake  future 
improvement of the system more difficult. 
The paper is organized as follows: the rest of Chapter 1 provides background 
information on the Project, its planning and development, physical features, 
andinstitutional  structure,anddescnbes  thesampleareaandresearchmethods. 
Chapter2  discusses what happened during maha 1986/1987, from the planning 
phase to the failure of the crop, and its impact on  the settlers.  Chapter 3 
analyzes the institutional response and roots of  the  problem.  Chapter 4, 
recapitulates the connections between the problems and  distress people faced 
and the institutional stresses,  and identifies some steps that could be taken, as 
well as future research needs. 
PLANNING AND  FINANCING OF THE PROJECT 
The planning of  the  new  scheme began in the  1950s, originating with the 
drawing up of a tentative plan fordeveloping the water resources of eight  majar 
river basins, including the Kirindi Oya. A reconnaissance report on  the natural 4  Insrcrductbn 
~~dKirkdiO)raBasinwasdoneia  1956. FoU~gtMsthiStheIrrigirtion 
DepartmentflD)didfurtherstudie.shm 1961-1975,including ameyof  the 
area in I973  by the  survey Department. 
The  Asian  Development Bank  (ADB)  got involved in the scheme in March 
1976, when the guvemnat  requested assistance for what was hen  known as 
thlE~YdHaRfXWE  ’ Irrigation and Agricultural DevelopnentRqject. 
Subsequent visirs by  the Bank in May and July 1976 identified  the project as 
suitable for bauk  assistance.  The Bank approved US$49,ooO for further 
investigation and technical assistance.  In 1977, a Bank appW  mission 
visited the project. Based on its findings  in the field, feasibility reports, and 
discussions with the govenunent, the Bank  approved a loan of US$% million 
to finance  the entire foreign exchange cost 
The  involvement of  other donors for co-financing  started  in April 1978 and 
September 1979, resulting in the reduction of  the Asian Development Bank 
loan to US$20 million. The  International Fund for Agricultural Development 
contributed  WS$12.0 million,  and Krediranstaltfur  Wiederaufbarr  contributed 
US$13.3 million (Ash  DeveIopment Bank 1986). 
Variowsfactors,including  ahighinflationrate,  shortageof skilledlabor,and 
a delay in finalizing the contract delayed starting dam construction until 
September 1980, ow and  a half years behind schedule. The  estimated cost of 
the Project increased owing to these factors. A review of  the cost estimate in 
December 1980 revealed a cost overrun of about 105 percent of the total cost 
estimated in August 1977. 
This prompted the government to request the Bank  and the co-financiers  to 
provide supplementary financing.  In  response, the  Bank carried out M 
financed comprehensivereviews  and  studies reassessing  the technical viability 
of the Project.  In order  to narrow the gap between available finances and the 
updated cost estimates,  possible modifications of the scope  and  phasing of the 
Project were considered,  keeping in mind the technical  and  economic viability 
of modified props& published in November 1982.  The  International Fund 
for Agricultural Development and Kredimstalt fur  Wiederaufbau also joined 
in the investigations.  This review led to  the  phasing of the scheme.  Phase I, 
which included construction of  the reservoir and  part of the new system,  and 
rehabiIitation of  the old areas, was to be  financed by  the funds  provided  for the 
originalKirindiOyaIrrigation  SettIementProjecttogetherwithsupplemeativy 
financing.  T&  estimated cost of Phase I was US$T9.9 millim, of  which 
vidadbythehm. canstructton  -  insaneofthe 
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DEVELOPMENT AND BASIC FEATURES OF  TIHE PROJECT 
The Kirindi Oya Irrigation  System has been designed to  incorporate six 
existing tanks  and a new irrigated settlement sea.  The system incIudes four 
subsystems: 
1.  The Ellegala System,  tapping Kirindi Oya with five tanks which have been 
inexistence  for many years (the ”old” system),  supplementedhm thenew 
left-bank main cad; 
2.  The right-bank main canal system, with three new irrigation tracts in Phase 
I and  four in Phase 11. 
3.  The Ieft-bank main canal system with  two new irrigation tracts in each 
phase. 
4. The Badagiriya System on the Malala Oya. also a pre-existing system, with 
supplementary water to be provided from the right-bank canal.z 
The objective of  the Project is to develop approximately  13,000 hectares 
(ha) of land, including 5,870 ha in the new area of the right bank, 2,560 ha of 
new land on the left bank,  and 4,584 ha of  existing irrigated land (Table 1). 
In the new area,  5,151 ha are classified as well-drainedsoils, not suitable for 
flood irrigation,  1,908 ha as lowland, suilable for rice.  and  the remaining 
1,371  as intermediate lands  (Asian  Development  Bank 1982:7).  An 
important rationale for the  integration  of  the existing old system with the 
new system was to raise the annual cropping intensity ofthe older system from 
139 to  200  percent (i,e., full cropping in both yala and maha). 
%is  was supposed  to be ificluded undk  Phase  II. but the Cenrrat coordinating 
Commitee recently decided to exclude it because of shortage of watcr. Introduction  6 
Source of irrigation 
Table 1. Area irrigated, in hectares. under Kirindi Oya Scheme 
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Irrigation System Layout 
The right-bank main canal, when completed, will be 33 km  Iong, terminating 
at the Badagiriya Tank (Figure 1).  Ultimately it is to  serve 5.869 ha as well 
as supplement the Badagiriya System. The design capacity varies from 13.0 
cubic meters  per second (m3/sec) at the head reach, to 2.0 m3/s/sec at the tail. 
It  is equipped with 15 gated regulators in the first 20 km  to  maintain water 
levels.  The first 20  km pass through Tracts 1, 2, and 5 (Phase-I Tracts) and 
the remainder through Tracts 3,4,6,  and 7. The  distribution system of  the 
right-bank main canal includes  a branch canal about 4 km long,  45 km of 
distributaries, and about 753  km  of field channels. 
The left-bank main canal takes off from the downstream end of the left- 
bank sluice outlet and  runs  south for 14 km. A feeder canal from the left-bank 
main canal returns to the original river bed  to  supply water to the Fdlegala 
System. The Weerawila  and Pannagamuwa tanks are fed from a right-bank 
inlet horn the river bed while the Debarawewa, Tissa, and Yoda tanks  are fed 
from the left-bank  inlet.  The le€t-bank main canal serves Tracts 1  and  2 in 
Phase I and Tracts 3 and  4 in Phase IT. 
The Organizational Structure of the Project 
The organizational  structure for development and management of the Project 
is described and  analyzed in detail in  Chapter 3.  The two major implementing 
agencies of  project development during the planning and construction phase 
have been the ID and the Land Commissioner’s Department, both within the 
Ministry of Lands  and Land Development. The ID is responsible for planning 
and design and construction of the irrigation infrastructure and other capital 
investments,  while the Land Commissioner’s Department is responsible for 
layout and development of  settlements.  selecting settlers.  and  assisting 
settlers in adapting to their new environment. Because thehoject has moved 
into  an operationat phase, the importance of other departments, particularly 
the Department of  Agriculture, Deparunent of Agrarian Services. and more 
recently the Irrigation Management Division (IMD) of  the Minisuy of Lands 
and  Land Development have become increasingly important Settlement of Cultivators on the Right Bank 
During Phase I, 2,713 families wereto be  settled  in  11 “hamlets” on the 
right bank; “hamlet”  is the  term used to  refer to  villages,  which  are 
numbered  and not named.  By late  1986,2,429  families (90 percent of the 
target) had been  settled. The distribution among right-bank tracts is shown  in 
Table 2. 
Table 2, DisaibuEion of hamlets by tract, and number of families settled, 
Area 
tight bank 





Number of  To be  Actually 
hamlets  settled  settled 
4  85 1  803 
3  857  768 
2  448  322 
2  557  536 
11  2713  2429 
Source: Land  CommksWs  Department 
I’ I 
I  1 
aid  Resident 
Engineer 
Project Manager  Assistant  Assismu  District-led  Project &ger 
(Sdmmi)  Commissioner  Director  OT project-level  (old am) 
(Agra~ian  (Agriculture)  higher  AOjedManager 
SvvicCa)  (new  area) 
Fksident  Assistant Project Manager 
Engineer  (Sscttlement) 
NOW: 
1.  Additional Commissioner (Land)  attends  this meeting asqresmtativefrom 
2.  District Minister attends meetings when important issues  are discussed, 
Prior  to 1970,settIement  inirrigation  schemes  followedatinearspatial form 
along the canals. It was felt, however, that this was detrimental to developing 
social  cohesion and  made providing centralized services difficult. Therefore, 
in planning Mahaweli settlements, it was decided to establish hamlets of not 
more than  100-125 settlers in clusters and  close proximity. It was hoped this 
would lead to  closer coope.ration and cohesion  by  allowing for  primary 
contacts. Later, with the first accelerated Mahaweli System (System C), this 
was enlarged to 200-250  families  to broaden the social relationships being 
established to reduce  the costs of providing services. Thus the Kirindi Oys 
settlement pattern  reflects  the  cmnt settlement  planning  procechrres 
In L  fanning  community lie  Kirindi Oya a fanner  should be able to nave€ 
quicklyanddytohisfann. Inearlierschernesthis  was notpwibiebecause 
homesteadswereseperrately hated onthe unirrigable highlands, oftenfar 
the Land Commissicmer’s Department. 
(Stanbury 1988:22-23)+ I0  Introduction 
from the irrigated  land. This “socio-agro distance”  was shortened in  the 
Mahaweli scheme from  1.6 - 2.4 km to 0.8 km by locating higable areaclose 
to the homesteads (Bulankulame 1986:4).  In Kirindi Oya, in some  cases  this 
criterion of socio-agro distance is not met 
For irrigation and water management the layout of the irrigation system 
may faciliate or constrain the development of  farmer participation and the 
formation of  user groups  for  higation management  at  the  tertiary  and 
secondary levels. Therefore placement of farmers who use a common water 
course or outlet  in one  hamIet develops common interests and a sense  of 
belonging. Amunugama (1965: 146), writing on Chandrikawewa, says: 
The nearest approximation to the “jwd integrity” of the village  that 
obtains in a colonization scheme is  thesolidarity  of  the  colonists 
living along a distributary channel ...  There is a community ofinterests 
in that the cultivations of  all the colonists in that group depend on the 
flow  of water along that particular canal. 
The Kirindi Oyasituation  approximates but does’not  achieve this  standard; 
Table 3 shows that in several cases farmers on the same distributary chnel 
xe split between  two hamlets. Because distributary-channel organizations 
were initially organized  by hamlet,  this  has ied to some  difficuIties,  as is 
discussed in Chapter 3, 
Table 3. Correspondence of residential area  and distributary. 
Main  and secondary system  Residential area 
Branch Canal-12 - Distributary Channel-2 
Branch Canal-12 - Distributary Channel-3 
Branch Canal-12 - Distributary Channel4 
Branch Canal-12 - Distributary Channel-5 
Branch Canal-12 - Distributary Channel-6 
Branch Canal-12 - Distributary Channel-7 
Branch Canal-12 - Distributary Channel-8 
Hamlet 11 




Hamlet 10 and 11 
Hamlet 8 and 11 
Source: IZMI  field survey. 
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LOCATION OF  THE RESEARCH: THE SAMPLE AREA 
Irrigation System Layout and Allotments 
The  arm  studied during maha 1986/1987-is located in Tract  5B,  under the 
right-bank main canal. This area was chosen with  a view to  the longer-term 
research planned in  Kjrindi Oya? It is located in an  area that is presently near 
the tail of the system.  but will be in the middle after Phase 11 is constructed; it 
is on Branch Canal-2 so that the performance of a modemte-sized  subsystem 
can  be studied in the future;  and it  contains both poorly drained and weIl- 
drained soils, which will facilitate work on  irrigation management for crop 
diversification in the future. 
Branch Canal-2 is equipped with single-gated underflow-typeregulators. 
Water is conveyed to  the fields through distributary channels  and  field 
channels equipped with gated  offtakes.  Distributary channels originate from 
the right-bank main canal as well  as  from  Branch  CanaI-2. Though  direct 
field  channels originating from Branch Canal-:!  are common, direct field 
channels from  the  the right-bank main  canal are  rare.  Sub-distributary 
channels and  sub-field channels ate also common. Water is supplied to each 
allotments by fieldor  sub-fieldchannels  which haveconcrete farm outlets with 
removable wooden gates. 
The  sample area  consisted of  all  the  land  irrigated by  Distributary 
Channel-2  of Branch Canal-2, in Tract 5. All the field channels (Table4 and 
Figure 3)  on  this distributary were studied.  In addition.  10 allotments (1  1.5 
percent of the  total) were  chosen  from  the head,  middle,  and tail  of 
Distributary Channel-2  from  three  field channels  to  observe  agricultural 
behavior. The three field channels were numbers 10,13,  and 14. 
Distributary  Channel-2 irrigates 87 official l-ha alIotments. There are 7 
field channels, giving an average of  about  12 allotments pet field channel, 
The irrigated area  is 87 ha. Field ChanneI-9 has the smallest number  of 
allotments (3,  while Field C!hannei- 13 has  the most (19).  All  the allotments are 
3Th;s longer-tam research was initi~ted  in  February 1988,  with funding assistance 
from the Asian Development Bank. €2  Introduction 
sd  by field chaanels  and there we no  direct farm  trunoats from main 
canals, branch  cds,  OT  distributary channels, in  contrast with older Sri 
Lankan  systems. The distniutary and fEld channeIs are equipped  with gates 
which can be Iocked for rotational issues. 
Table 4. Field channels of Distribuky Channel-2, with  number of allotments. 
Field  channels  Number  of  Number of  zpcetion 
dlotmentg  smplc allotmeults 
Field Channcl- 9  05 
Field Cha11nd-20  15 
Field Channel-11  09 
Field Channel-I2  16 
Field Channel-I3  19 
Field Channel-14  16 
Field Channel-15  07 
Head  . 
03  Head 
HcSn 
Middle 
04  Tail 
03  Middle 
Head 
Total  87 
Percentage  100 
10.0 
11.5 
Source: Household survey of Hamlet 11 and Distributary Channel-2,  maha 1986/1987 
Land  tenure  is  an  important  factor  affecting  figationmanagement. 
We found 89 operators, though there are only 87 allotments; this is not due 
to land fragmentation but  to  2 encroachers  residing in and cultivating  0.2 
ha  each,  in 2 allotments allocated M  2 settlers. 
Social Characteristics of the Settlers 
Out of the 93 household heads  in the Distributary Channel-2 sample area only 
89 were operators. The involvement of93  persons in 87 allotments is shown in 
Table 5. 
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Table 5. Legal status of household heads in sample area 
Status  Number of persons  Residence 
Legal  settlers Operating  84  Hamlet 11 
Legal settlers deprived of 
land by original inhabitants 
claiming the land as their 
freehold  02  Hamlet 11 
Legal settler (leased out)  01  Hamlet 11 
Others 
Encroachers cultivating 
a portion of settlers' land 
field but not cultivating  01' 
(government servant)  01 
02' 
Encroachers  residing in  the 
Leased-in farmer 
Two  original inhabitants 
cultivating lands allocated to 
settlers claiming it as their 








I Total  93 
aEvicted from land two months after the commencement of cultivation by Project 
authorities. 
Source: Household survey, maha 1986/1987. 
The 87 allottees with rights to land in Distributary Channel-2 live  in Hamlet 
11. With the exception of three farmers (two under Field Channel-10 and one 
underFieldChannel-13), all havebeensettledinHamlet 11 sothat thosewho 
share water from a  common field channel would be neighbors.  The three 
exceptions, though living in Hamlet 11,  are not neighbors of others sharing 
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water from  their field channels.  This has happened because  they  had 
exchanged the original allotments given to them for new  ones. Out of  the 87 
allottees, 3 are not actual operators: 2 because the  freehold for their  lands 
has  been claimed by  original inhabimts and 1  because  his allotment has been 
leased out to a government official. 
The  other five household heads h  the household survey are  not settlers. 
The two who claim lands  allocated to settlers as their heehold live in Adalla 
and Uduwila, purana (preexisting) villages near Hamlet 11. The other three 
are encroachers residing in the Adalla field area, two cultivating a portion of 
land held by two legd settlers and one residing in a small portion of land 
cultivated by a sealer. 
It should be noted that there is no basis for claiming that settlers of Hamlet 
11 are in any  statistical sense representative  of the larger scheme. It has been 
mentioned to us that this hamlet includes relatively more wealthy people who 
are  not  as serious  about cultivation as others,  but we have no  basis  for 
evaluating this claim.  In general, however, contacts withsettlers from other 
hamlets strongly suggest that Hamlet  11  is not unique or  unusual in any 
significant way. 
All the household heads  in our sample are Sinhala Buddhists from southern 
Sri  Lanka.  The majority of settlers  in  Distributary Channel-2 are from 
Hakmana and Deniyaya eIectorates in the Matara District.  Of  the four from 
Tissamaharama, two are relocatees who previously had irrigated land under 
Lassanawewa, a small old tank which was breached in order to be included in 
the command  area. The  other two are encroachers in the area which came 
under  the scheme. 
The population includes three  hfferent caste groups,  Govigm,  Vahwnpwu, 
andRuda. The majority in Distributary Channel-2 are of Govigama casre. but 
all the farmers on two particular field channels are of Vahumpwa caste. We 
could not observe in detail the impact of caste differences on behavior in their 
face-to-face interaction in daily life, 
Except for the 9 households from Tissamaharama and 1 from Ratgama  (6 
out of  these 10 are not legal allottees), all the settlers moved into the scheme 
in 1985 and  1986. Althoughsettledofficiallyin  thehamlet, 13of these families 
do not  reside there permanently. Even  those who are settled permanently 
make  regutar  visits  to their original viIlages in the Matara District to see the 
family members who remained in the villages. The lack of  facilities such as 16  Imdwbn 
db.in%ingwater, lteakb,  andaducatian are the mainreasons  hr  tbe &by 
Tfrc  first wawissue to  Dismi  channel-2 was made  ndy  oae  year 
afterp,xplewexeseukdinHamletlI.  Theyweregivenfree  food  rations 
through the World Food Prop  dming  this period  Secsuse the land 
who pfd  to hire their own men,  there was no possibility forthe setdm 
to  work as wage laborers. Out of  the 87 allottees in the sample only 4 had 
employment as casual wage labmas in infrasaucd  dwebpmmt work in 
the Project. 
The  settlers  brought  with  them  to the settlement building materials to 
build temporary houses for shelter, pots and  pans to  cock some furniture, 
money  to buy essential items,  bicycles, and radios. The authorities give Rs 
1,500 (US$SO)  to  each se#Ier who builds his house to official specitiCatioIlp. 
Satlers who do not adhere  to the Specitication do  not receive this allowance. 
We  have  no  data on how many people in Hamlet 11 actually  received the 
allowance. 
Out of  the 93 household heads in our sample, 89 were males and  4 were 
females.  The 4 female and 71 male households heads were married  while 
18 males were  bachefors.  Eightyeight  household heads migrated  o the 
settlement area  from the  Matara  District  where  education  facilities are 
available, There were 2 graduates, 34 qualified  at GCE  (Advanced Level) 
(senor secondary),  26  with secondary  education,  and 27  with primary 
education among the 93 settlers.  Those who  have  senior  secondary and 
higher-level educational qualifications said that when they met their Members 
of  Parliament with  the hope of  getting employment they  were given land 
instead. The educated s~ttlms  seemed  to prefer employment to farming. The 
use of  wage  laborers from their original villages by  these educated  young 
farmers was observed during  rnaha 1986/1987. Some were  even reluctant 
to do manual work in the field. 
in bringiflg  f8mily  members to thssetclement. 
dev-and  otlier walk in them  however, were ow  by cw- 
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RISEARCH METHODS 
This research was planned to  focus on the institutional aspects of  irrigation 
system management in a new settlement scheme. As  mentioned above,  the 
sample area was chosen  with  bnger-tenn research objectives in mind. A 
research officer was assigned to the  sample arm  to begin the research in 
October 1986.  In  order to become acquainted with the area,  settlers, and 
officials, the research  officer  spent the f-t  month establishing  rapport. 
During this period he met many people infomdly  to explain the research and 
to get to know ppb.  He also  obtained  official data about the system and 
sample area such as  maps,  household lists,  water-issue schedules,  and 
organizational charts of  the agencies. 
After this fist  month, the research officer concentrated on gathering  data 
by  participant  observation  and  informal interviewing of  key informants, 
officials, and settlers, Because he  arrived  at  the  start of  maha  1986/1987, 
he focused on systematic recording of irrigation and agricultural behavior; 
interviews  and  observation  of agency officials’ behavior, and activities 
(meetings, water deliveries, etc);  interviews with farmers:  and observation 
of farmers’ organization meetings  and farmers’ meetings with officials. 
We  began gathering quantitative data  after having  established  some 
rapport with farmers. These  included a household survey of the  sample area 
and recording of agricultural and irrigation activities.  The primary  focus, 
however,  was  on  collecting qualitative  &ta  on  peoples’ behavior and 
perceptions, values, and interpretations. As the season progressed, and there 
was a shift from struggling with water distribution problems to drought -- mtal 
lack of water -- the research focus also shifted to  the response of both settlers 
and  officials to the crisis at hand Chapter 2 
Water  Management  in Maha  1986/1987 
WATER  MANAGEMENT AT  THE  SYSTEM LEVEL 
Planning Procedures 
THE ~ANNINO  PROCESS  for the Season depends largely on the availability of 
water in the reservoir.  The Project Coordinating Committee. of  the scheme, 
which consists of higher-level project officers  and  some district-level officers 
of  the line agencies,  meets monthly under the chairmanship of the Government 
Agent, Hambantota. This committee evaluates project performance during the 
previous months. ~ssues  relating to agiculturd programming for the corning 
season me also discussed  at these meetings. The water Level in the reservoir is 
also reviewed. 
Before the beginning of a season, if the water level is at 33 percent or more 
of  the total capacity, a decision to commence the cultivation season can be 
made.  The dates are officially fixed at hnna (cultivation) meetings after 
discussing the relevant issues with farmers in detail at “pre-kanna” meetings. 
Issues such as the extent of the area to be cultivated for the season, the arm  to 
be given priority, and  crops or seed varieties are also discussed at the Project 
Coordinating Committee meetings, to  reach a consensus among  officials 
before the pre-kanna and  kanna meetings. The District Minister, Hambantota, 
attends project coordinating committee meetings when important issues are 
discussed. The Project Coordinating Committee plays the policy-rnaking role 
usually played by the Disuict AgriculturaI Committee. 
Pre-kanna meetings for the season were held in mid-October, nearly one 
month prior to the first water issue. Kanna meetings were held one week later. 
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These meetings,  held  at each at  ( 1  to 7)  to  enable farmers in all the tracl 
to  participate, are preparatory  meetings  €or the kanna meetings, and are 
attended by higher-level project officers, middle- and field-level officers of 
line agencies such as the Dqmtments of  Inigation, Agrhulture, Agrarh 
Services, higation Management Division (MD), banks. and the Agricultural 
Insurance Board. The meetings wece organized by inviting fmm  through 
two agencies, the Land Commissiorser's Department through colonhation 
officers and the IMD  through elected field-channel leaders. 
In  Kirindi  Oya thepre-kanna  meetings  wexe chaired by the Project Manager 
(Settlement) or  his deputy.  The  purpose of  the meetings is to explain the 
proposed  agricultural program  for the season to  the  farmers and get their 
approval,  However, the  1986 pre-kanna meetings were used by  farmers to 
present their grievances to project-level higher officers  and discuss the  problems 
encountered in the previous season,  which in their view occurred  because  of the 
negligence of officials. Though the officials  attending the meeting cannot find 
immediate solutions to some  of  these problems, the farmers are allowed to 
express themselves in order to avoid a tense situation at the kanna meting 
itself. 
In this  sense, the pre-kanna meeting  fits well  into Sri  Lankan culture. 
A good  comparison would be  Ankeliya,  a traditional drama performed  in 
southern Sri Lanka in the worship of  Goddess Pattini.  In this drama erotic 
and  aggressive impulses are expressed overtly  in  symbolic form in order 
to create a harmonious and peaceful  social environment,  Similarly. pm 
kanna meetings provide a forum for arguments and  disscussion -- expression 
of conflicts and tensions -- which lead to agreement between farmers and 
official.  As a result,  kanna meetings normally end harmoniously, usually with 
the  farmers consenting to the official agricultural program for the season. 
The kanna  meeting  is held under  the  provisions of  the Irrigation Act 
and is presided over by  the Government Agent or an officer representing 
him.  The meetings is attended by  project-level officers, middle- and field- 
level officers of line agencies,  and  in some  cases  district-level  officers of  these 
agencies. The decisions  taken at the pre-kanna meeting are  usually officially 
confirmed at the kanna meeting. 
At the kanna meeting held in Hamlet  11 for the Tract-5 irrigation area, 
the plans  for water  issues and  cultivation presented to farmers  at the pre 
kanna meeting were ratified. The  decisions made at the  meeting were: 
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completion of canal cleaning work before 30 October 1986, 
commencement of water issue on 05 November 1989, 
completion of sowing by 05 December 1986, 
cultivation of three-to  three-and-a-half-month  rice varieties, 
stoppage of  water issues on 05 March 1987,  and 
commencement of  harvesting from 20 March 1987. 
The higarion Engineer (Bight Bank),  wha represented  the Irrigation 
of water issue. He explained to the fanners that the Department had to duce 
the water level in the reservoir to  repair the spillway gates. Be expressed hope 
that the repairs would be completed by the end of October and  the water level 
in the reservoir, which was 50 meters above mean sea  level  (MSL)  on the day 
of the meeting, would rise to 51.8 meters above MSL,  the minimum required 
to commence water issues.  In addition he remarked that water-distribution 
problems would crop up  because 4,247  ha are to  be cultivated during this 
season instead of 1,162 ha cultivated in the previous season  (the system's first 
season). 
Though damage to crops by stray cattle  was a major issue at the meeting, no 
proper plan to protect the crop was presented.  The only solution was for the 
farmers to  build  fences  around  their  fields,  according  to the  Assistant 
Commissioner, Agrarian  Services.  But farmers requested the Additional 
Government Agent, who represented the Government Agent, to issue gun 
licenses to shoot stray cattle.  The farmers claimed  that when  the crop is 
damaged, the cultivation officers to whom the farmers complain invariably 
take the side of cattle owners,  a powerful Iand-hoIding  genhy known locally  as 
gambaruya. 
B-mt  (ID), made additional comments regardirlg the date of commencement 
Operating Procedures 
Operation of sluice gates, gated regulators, turnout gates along main canals, 
branch canals, and distributary canals down to the field-channel turnouts is 
done by the ID.  The highest project-level ID officer is the Chief Residential 
Engineer,  whoisassisted~yYSseniorImigation~~(w~Managemenrx 
and the Resident Engineers and (Right Bank,  Left Bank, and Head Works). 
Each  Resident Engineer  has an irrigation engineer to assist him in-opcratiOn 
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The actual operation is done by  “irrigators”  (jalapalaku  karnkaru) on the 
instructions  of technicil assistants. The technial assistants are assisted in their 
work by Work Supervisors, who are supposed to make regular field visits. 
Before commencement of the water issue for the season, the technical assistant 
is expected collect data on Iand use under distributary channels and those field 
channels  receiving direct issues from main canals or branch canals and submit 
data u> the irrigation engineers of  the respective areas in the right or left bank; 
in reality the design assumptions are used.  The irrigation engineers with the 
assistance of  the technical assistants calculate water requirements for their 
irrigation areas based on crop water requirement tabIes.  A copy of the water 
requirement schedule is  sent to  the  Senior Irrigation Engineer for water 
management.  The  water-issues down  to  the  field  channel turnouts  are 
supposed to be made according to these water requirement schedules.  RelertSing 
water from the reservoir in terms of these schedules is done on the instructions 
of  the resident engineer in charge of the respective mah  canal.  When the 
implementation of  a rotational issue is necessary, water-issue timetables 
should be prepared by technical assistants for the areas under their charge, 
supervised by  the irrigation engineer. 
The technical assistants in charge of  particular higation areas  are responsible 
for the operation of the gated regulators on main canals and  branch canals in 
their areas, in addition M  disaibu~y-  and field-channel turnout operation for 
the dismibution of water, These  gated regulators are operated in such a way that 
while various discharges are made, the water level in the main and branch 
canals should remain the same. 
Water distribution in turnout areas is supposed to be handled by farmers 
organized into turnout groups. Field-channel leaders are elected by the farmers 
under the guidance  of the project manager. The technical assistants had handed 
over the wooden farm turnout gates to field-channel leaders to enable them to 
implement rotations. 
Irrigation Behavior 
Water issues for the season started with the arrangements described above. The 
water level in the reservoir was 50 meters above mean sea level (MSL)  on the 
day  of water issue f?om  the reservoir; below  the established level of  51.8 
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above  MSL  required for starting deliveries.  Water issues to the five tanks 
under the Ellegala  System  had  been  done  sometime earlier when  water 
stored  in  the reservoir was released to facilitate repair of the spillway gates. 
The water issues were done on arorational basis for which a very complicated 
water issue timerable had been prepared (see Appendix).  It involved rotations 
both among and within field  channels. In fact, there was a constant flow in the 
main  and  branch  canals, and a constant but  reduced flow  in distributary 
channels throughout the period of water issue. 
Operation down to the field-channel turnout was done by  irrigators, who 
were  very  busy  in  the field.  Work supervisors made regular inspections. 
Technical assistants made field visits in order to  give further instructions 
regarding water distribution. When fieldchannel leaders or farmers complained 
about their problems to irrigation engineers, technical assistants were directed 
to take appropriate action.  Sometimes farmers met the technical assistants 
themselves in the field or in the office to find solutions for theirproblems. On 
occasions when  farmers felt that  appropriate action  was  not taken,  they 
complainedto theIMDProject Manager, who consulted the respective resident 
engineers to solve such probIems, Irrigation engineers and resident engineers 
themselves monitored main canals to check whether appropriate water Ievels 
were being maintained in main and  branch canals. 
Despite these efforts  by the ID, there was one occasion when the water level 
in the right-bank canal rose alarmingly during the night.  Though the reasons 
for this are still a mystery,  on the following day we observed that entire fields 
in Tract 5 were €dl  of water, and water had overflowed onto the Hambanto& 
Wellawaya road in several places. According to reliable sources the technical 
assistants themselves had to do  manual operation of the gated regulators on the 
right-bank main canal in order to prevent bund erosion. 
From the following day onwards thewaterlevelintheright-bankmaincanal 
went down drastically,  creating a scarcity of water in the right-bank area.  The 
reason for this was the main canal bund erosion near the syphon between  Tracts 
1 and 2. Irrigation officials  explained this as  havingresulted  from a water block 
inside  the syphon. Rightly or wrongly, however, many farmers and  officials of 
other departments claimed the cause was management inefficiency on  the part 
of the ID.  The 1D placed night watchers on duty at gated reguhtors after this 
incident. No  water issues weremade to theright-bank main canal foraboutone 
week following this incident, until the canal bund was repaired, 
On another occasion during land preparation, the water level in  the right- 
bankcanal went down drastically fonowing a short spellofrah. It was evident ohe  early  &e SeasoR. 
From  the farmas’ perspeclive, the  “normal supply”  issued by the  ID 
seemed  insufficient for land preparation.  The farmers argued that four-hour 
water-issues to each allotment twice a week were not sufficient because they 
cdd  not retain water in the fields.  They preferred to  have a constant flow 
during the land preparation period. Themfore, farmers  refused to follow the 
water-isflle timetabfe and adhered  to simultaneous warn sharing.  The  technique 
of  simultaneous water sharing took different forms  from one field channel to 
another, depending on  the field conditions, the characteristics of  the farmer 
population, and the participation of  field-channel leaders.  This is discussed 
mer  in the latter part of  this chapter, It was somewhat difficult to practice 
simultaneous  water sharing because the ID implemented a rotation down to the 
field channels, which  tended to  disrupt  fmers’attempts to  share water 
simultaneously. 
Simultaneous water sharing in turnout areas under a rotational issue at the 
system level had serious consequences for most of  the tail enders. There was 
achaotic situation during the first week of water issues in turnout areas. Water 
stealing ind illegal tapping of  field channels were very common during this 
period.  This  tense situation, however, improved after a short while when tail 
enders could use seepageand drainage water. The  tail-end fanners of long field 
channels  and tail-end field channels of distributary channels who did not have 
access to drainage OT seepage water, however, had tremendous  difficulties in 
irrigating their allotments. 
In ation,  the farmers  complained of defective canals,  farm turnouts and 
dher  inhtia~  -tuxes  which fesulted  in &cx@p  of  water to  their dlo~mt~. 
inigation officers were of  the view that dre  shortage of  water daring land 
preparation could  have been avoided by making constant issues to all the field 
channeh,  ntnd overloading them, given the lack of actual water requirement 
data. Butthiscouldnotbedonebecauseofthescarcityofwaterinthpreservoir. 
Another reason for the  shortage of water to tail enders was lack of active 
participation by field-channel leadem -- allottees elected by  farmers with legal 
rights to land and water from that field channel -- in the water distribution. 
Except for a few rare  cases in Tract 1, we did not observe of hear about active 
participation by these leaders in the water disnibution. This  is mainly because 
the  farmers’organizafions  were in a fornative stage, and also owing to  the 
defects in fanner organizations.  The  defects in  farmer organizations  are 
discussed in the next chapter. 
The irregular  supply  was  also  caused by  bund erosion of  canals  and 
management  problems over a period of 14 days of acute water shortage to  the 
Branch Canal-2 area  and 2 days’ shortage of water to the entire right-bank area 
during the land-preparation period. 
THE  DROUGHT AND  ITS IMPACT 
Water issues  for the season were made with the expectation of heavy rains from 
November to  January, 85 is normal for  this  period. Instead  the  raitls  failed  and 26  Water Management in Maha 1986-1987 
Developed 
the right- and left-bank sluices began declining drastically in early January 
1987. Discharges into the right-bank main canal, which had ranged between 
2.83 and  5.04 m3/m  in November and  December, dropped to  2.7rn3/sec on 
8 January, and to 0.7 rn3/sec by  13 January.  Thereafter, the range for the 
remainder of  maha 1986/1987  was 0.7-1  .lm3/sec. As a result, water levels in 
the main canals could not be maintained to issue water to downstream tracts. 
In addition, water levels in the five tanks under the EUegala system had by 
this time also declined alarmingly. There was ademand  by the farmers in those 
areas for water from the Lunugamvehera Reservoir. At the establishment of 
the settlement project, these farmers  been granted priority rights to the water. 
The Project Coordinating Committee held  a  special meeting  in early 
January  and reviewed the situation. It took a decision toretain the Tract- 1  areas 
under the right- and left-bank systems and the old area under the EUegala 
System. The tad-end parts of  Yoda and Weerawila Tanks (under Ellegala). 
where culdvation  had  started almost a month late,  were doomed to fail because 
of  lack of water. 
The overall result of  the season as reported by the water management 
consultants working in Kirindi Oya is shown in Table 6. 
Table 6.  Cropped areas in hectares, maha 198611937. 









1347  1115  @I 
1747  1332  0 
990  77  1  0 
3712  3600  3400 
850  0  0 
8646  6818  4047 
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In Iate January, even the cultivation under Tract 1 on the right-bank was on 
the verge of complete failure as aresult of scarcity of water. At this stage field- 
channel leaders organized a shrumdunu (cooperative  labor campaign) under 
the guidance of the Project Manager (IMD) to dig a canal inside the reservoir 
to bring the remaining dead storage water to the right-bank sluice gate. With 
the heavy equipment provided by the Chief Resident Engineer and  free manual 
labor from the farmers in Tract-1 area, work was completed within a short 
period.  The IMD Project Committee met in late January  and  decided to 
approach the farmers of the right-bank Tract- 1  area to appeal to them to try to 
save only the crop which can survive with the application of water once in a 
two- to three-week period.  As most of the field channel tail-end allotments 
were cultivated two to three weeks late. they could not be retained because of 
the scarcity of water. The field-channel  leaders agreed to suggest  this proposal 
to the Tract-1 farmers. 
The agricultural instructor in Weerawila Division, who was the secretary of 
the Project Committee, walked from one field channel to another in the Tract- 
1 area with field-channel leaders to sort out the allotments that could be saved 
and to  explain impending danger of  the  drought to the  farmers.  Several 
meetings were also held in Tract I, organized by the respective distributary 
channel-level organizations, to explain the  proposal of the Froject Committee 
to farmers. Though some farmers  agreed to it, many opposed the idea with the 
remark that if disaster suikes,  everybody should die, not just a selecred few. 
There was great resentment among the farmers in Tracts 2 and  5  and tail 
enders of Weerawila and Yoda Tanks over the crop failure.  Many who were 
solely dependent on cultivation were desperate.  Poverty and hopelessness 
generated in them an anger against government agencies, which they viewed 
as responsible fm crop failure. In the days of severe scarcity, they searched €or 
clues to put the responsibility for failure on the organization involved in water 
management and decision making regarding the cuItivation season, 
The major “cause”  of  the crop failure, in  many farmers’ eyes, was the 
reduction of water levels in the reservoir to complete the construction of the 
spillway gates. This was begun sometime prior to the fmt water issue for the 
season. There hadbeen some delays on the part of thecontractor in construction 
of the spillway gates. The ID was askedto fill the reservoir for its ceremonial 
inauguration before the gates had been completed. According to ID officials, 
it  was  therefore  necessary  to  complete the  installation  of  the  spillway 
gates while the reservoir was low, and before heavy rains were anticipated. I 
7 
nedasothafacton 
agency officials was apparent.  They quoted these reports  at a later stage and 
remarked  that the cultivation down to  the end of Tract 2 could have been easily 
retained  if not for this “mistimed”  repair. 
Farmer representatives of the old area claimed they had witnessed, over a 
period of two months, water flowing along the river  as if  it wma  time of flood, 
during the period of repairs to the spillway gate.  Their main accusation was 
that water was released to Kirindi Oya without filling the five tanks  under the 
Ellegala System. 
The Chief Resident Engineer  whom we interviewed on this matter was of 
the opinion that the quantity released during the period of repair was around 
8.64 million  cubic  meters, an “insignificant  quantity”  which  could not 
contribute much to retaining  the larger area dried up in the season. The reason 
this work was necessary after  just one cultivation season was unfortunately not 
explained to farmers,  The general rumor among farmers and some agency 
offv5als, however, was that  water  issues for yah 1986 were made without 
proply  completing the spillway gates because of a hasty decision of politicians 
or higher-level officials. 
F- 
WATER MANAGEME” AT DiSmUTARY  LEVEL, 
ThefirrtwatcrsssreetolSistributaryChaonel-2formahs1~98rfwasm  to 
opened for the seaam.  Tbe  water l=quhmna for &e  channel bad bee0 
calcuIated based on ID gwi&lks by the  technical assistants ,  uader dtt 
supefvisioa of tbc  irrigation engineer.  AIh@  the tec$nical  StsSisEant Was 
November1~,fourdaysaP0tr~head-sluice~dthe~~~wso 
expected ta prepare a watea-issUe timetable fa  his irrigatiun area  prior fo the 
commencementofwaterissues,the  timecable wasnotready on  the  firstday of 
tho water issue.  The  ID. however, delivered the timetable  tD the fanner 
The  technicai  assistant is in charge of water distribution down to the field- 
channel turnouts.  He is assisted by  a work supervisor and an  imigafar.  The 
water distribution below theseturnoutsistheresponsibilityoftheficldchannel 
leader.  The  IMD  had  by  this time arranged election of leaders on  each field 
channel where water issues were to  be  made for the season. 
organizations four days lam. 
The  Water-Issue  Timetable:  Official  Assumptions  on Water 
Distribution 
In their messages to  farmers at  meetings held prior to water issues for the 
season,  the ID officials stressed the necessity of  adhering to the water-issue 
timetable of rotation to avoid distribution problems. The emphasis  on  rotation 
conveyed the view of the irrigation officials that the Kirindi Oyacanal system 
has been  designed  for rotational water issues which includes mtaticms mong 
and within field channels.  Therefore,  it was understood that my deviation 
bY 
would result in distribution problems.  This  view was furthea  rehated 
higation Engineer Nht  Bank) at a meeting held on the  &st  day  of water 
issue in Hamlet 11, and theofficial  view wasexpressedby him atthiarneethg 30  Water Management in Maha 1986-1987 
second), (there are seven field channels).  Therefore. the quantity of 
water in a field channel at a particular time is not sufficient for all the 
farmers on that fieldchannel  todraw water simultaneously. Any attempt 
at simultaneous sharing of water would ultimately result in shortage and 
nonavailability of  water to tail-end farmers.  It never guarantees an 
equitable distribution. The water-issue timetable guarantees two water 
issues for a period of four hours each within the first week, two issues 
for a period of three hours within the subsequent week, and so on for 
every allotment  until the end of the season. If the farmers strictly adhere 
to the timetable, water issued during the time specified  in  the  table 
suffices to irrigate an  allotment 
Implement a  tion of the Water -Issue Timetable 
With the commencement of  water issues, we observed the irrigator making 
regular visits to the Distributary Channl-2 area to implement the field-channel 
rotation and make necessary adjustments in the turnout gates of the distributary 
channel to  either increase or reduce  the water  flow  in  order  to maintain 
appropriate water levels in canals.  The  work supervisor and the technical 
assistant made occasional visits to supervise the irrigator and give him further 
instrUctions regarding turnout Operation when necessary. I D officials attempted 
to implement rotational  water issues according to the timetable on Disaibutary 
Chnel-2  throughout the  period from 10 November to the end of  December 
1986. This wasintempted from time to timeby management andotherdefects, 
which we described in the first part of  this chapter, and the rotation finally 
faded away as a result of severe drought 
Water-Distribution Problems: Views of Farmers and Officials 
During the  period of  water  issues,  Distributary Channel-2 farmers were 
confronted with such irrigation problems as shortage of water and irregular 
supply,  which were often manifestations  of distribution problems. It is true that 
the farmers did not follow the water-issue timetable recommended  by ID 
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officials.  Our fieId experience, however, suggests that nonadherence to  the 
recommended timetable by the  farmers was not the only caw  of  the distribution 
problems. In asking why farmers  did not adhere to the timetable, the following 
causes of distribution problems were identified: 
*  disagreement  between  officials  and farmers over  the  water-issue 
timetable; 
*  defects in the canals and structures,  and shortcomings in land leveling; 
*  the impact of  management of  the larger system;  and 
*  the ineffectiveness of farmer organizations in their formative stages to 
take the responsibility for field-channel water management 
Disagreement between offihls  and farmers over the timetable.  The 
farmers in Distriburary Channel-2 were opposed to rotational water issues 
during land preparation because of the difficulties  encountered in the previous 
season in retaining water in their allotments after irrigating them.  Out of 87 
allotments inDistributary Channel-2,lO  were being cultivatedforthe  rust time 
while the other 77 were being cultivated for the second time.  Eighty percent 
of the land in this area has been  classified as well-drained, where percolation 
and seepage is high according to the officers of  the Agnculture Department 
working in the project.  We observed that even fields which were full after 
being irrigated the previous day had gone completely dry on the following day. 
Because  of  this,  farmers wanteda constant flow during land preparation to keep 
the  soil muddy  so  they  could do the plowing easily and within the  time 
specified in the cropping calendar. 
This observation of very high  water requirements is consistent with the 
findings of Franks  and Harding (1987), based on research in the Inginimitiy a 
Scheme, that during the fmt season, on a new system, individual field- channel 
commands  usetwiceasmuch  wateras  forecastat  fulldevelopment. ApparentIy 
the ID officials at Kirindi Oya did not take this into account in planning water 
deliveries. *abjGcttdtahw-bsrigMirrigatioh  ThGycJabixl 
oighthig€bhisnot~bWcennotfmdaad~bdleatrs 
#-tomwater-.  Fawers~werecultivatiag~thefirsttimt 
aIso~thattbey~wtnetain~intfteir~~becaoaafthc 
WfW  *  by~~~teasonsfiprhy 
kdro-i&eirdim@lqJ  .  tbeiinwlam 
TheVieWSOfirrigetionofficedgregardingdistributiOnpaoblcrns~~ 
~mwg~~,wu~~~k~ 
with hrmas' views.  The  officials viewed them  as  having resukdfrom the 
channels.  Tbe  ofhcern howem, seemed umxlncemed about the farmers' 
inability to retain  water in the allotments. On  the other bd,  the officers of the 
Department of Agriculture were in agreement with the farmers'demand  for  a 
constant flow during the land-prepmtion &od.  They were frequently in the 
field during the season and were aware of the farmers' practical pblms  of 
cultivation. 
The ultimate  outcome of  this disagreement was the  existenCe of  two 
diffaent water distribution practice8 on Distributary Channel-2, one by  the ID 
down to  the  tield&umel  tumouts in accordance with  the cimetable,and 
the other by  farmers  below the field-channel tumouts, as an adaptation to  a 
timetable which they could not change. 
because of  the hikd  of Di&b~t~y-Cha~d-2  and the %ld 
Defects In the canals and stmctrrres. The overflow of  water in several 
places dong the bud of  Disaibutary Channel-2 was  a common incident 
throughout the period of water issues. As a result, the irrigator had to  reduce 
the water level in Distributary Channel3  on such occasions. The  result was an 
acute shortage of water far Field Channel 13, the tail-end field channel under 
Distributary Channel-2. In  addition to this there was a large  pond-&  place by 
the side of the head end of  Field Channel 13; water leaked into this pond, 
reducing the level in the field channel. Water was available in the fidd channel 
on only 30 days  out of the 50 on  which we made field visits to Field Channel- 
13. This led to  a percepth among the farmers under field chrmnel-13 that 
Distributary Chimd-2 bad  been designed  to issue water only to  the first six 
fieLdchame& ander  it and not  to heir  channel in the  tail.  They  argued  that 
btmuse lxstrihrn chanael-2can  carry  dy  170Iiterspertx!conditcan  issue 
with a 
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tribmy-channel bnnd and mad need& 
=pairs.  They  put the blame, however, on the  farmers d  the hd-end  field 
channels fa blocLing  the  distributary C-1  md  Wg  tbe gates of  field 
channels, claiming that these  are the  real causes for shortage d  warn on  tbe 
rail-endfieldchannels. Exceptforoneisolatedcaseof~~~~ofwatct 
in Fie1  of Field channel-12,  wbo was wmed 
the  field-  -  dsnotsulwrantiate 
these allegations.  Instead we found that the key variabb witb xegd  to  tbe 
availabiiity or nonavailability of  water in the td-end field channels was the 
water level at the head of Distriutary Channel-2. 
me tail-end hers  of  Field Channel-12 also had difficulties with water, 
mainlybecausewhenanadequatequantityofwaterwasissuedtothecanal,the 
areabetweenalloUnentnumbers  138 and 139 tendedtoerode,creatinganacute 
shortage of water at the tail. We observed the bund  erosion of Field Channel- 
12 once in this season, and  the farmers  told us that the same thing happened 
twice in  the previous season.  The  farmers  viewed this as resulting from 
unsatisfactory  consauction. The  irrigator  himself told us that he does not issue 
as much water to this field channel as to others, on  the request of farmers, for 
fear that it would erode the canal bunds.  The technical assistant told us  that 
he cannot comply with the  farmers' request for lining a portion of the field 
channel with  concrete slabs in order to  prevent erosion, even though such 
requests have been made by many farmers. 
Structural  defects  and  shortcomings  in  hnd &veUng.  Fanners 
complained about a number of  structural defects and shortcomings in land 
leveling work  by contractors, which in their view obstruct equaI distribution of 
water, These are listed in Table 7. 
ID officials agreed to repair the defective and broken field turnouts and 
install new field turnouts  in the fields where they were not available. Work on 
drainage canals was started in February  1987  to  solve drainage problems, 
Land-leveling problems  in the  Field  Channel-13 area  also  received  the 
attention of officiais who had prepared estimates for the work in the early part 
of  1987. Theprobtemsregardingtheallotmentsinwhich  fiddarmoUtsarenoZ 
within the boundary of the allotments,  however, cannot be  solved, tfccoTding 
totheID,becausetheyhavefixedthef~dtuntouts  inhadjoining~d 
fields, taking 34 
Table 7.  Structural defects as reported by farmers on  Distributary Channel-2. 
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Difficult to irrigate the 
field without blocking 
field channel 
Excess water damaging 
the crop 
Difficult to irrigate a 
portion of  the 
allotment 






broken by a 
Field turnouts no1 
within the bound- 
ary of allotments 
Field tumQuts 










11,14  3 
11,13, 15  & 
Is 
12,  13, 15 
Source: Household survey 1986/87 maha. 
How affected  P 
4 
More water flows to th 
head-end  allotments 
with  defective field 
turnouts 
Difficult to  irrigate 
allotments 
------I 
Dispute with farmers 
over sharing water 
I 
Difficult to irrigate a 
portion of  the field 
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Zmpact of  the management  of  the larger system.  There were thee 
occasionsof acute  water  shortage  to  the  Distributary  Channel-:!  area 
during  the land- preparation period, twice owing to the bund erosion of branch 
canals and the right-bank canal, and once apparently due to the failure of a 
higher-level irrigation official to give timely hsmctions to “increase”  the 
water flow in the right-bank canal.  As discussed below, these incidents had a 
major impact on water distribution atthe  distributary-channel level and  created 
an unfriendly attilude towards irrigation officials among farmers, because this 
was the timewhen farmers wanted aregularsupplyas they had broughttractors 
and wage laborers from their native villages in the Mama District u, complete 
land preparation. 
Farmers viewed the erosion of canals  as  having resulted from unsatisfactory 
construction, for which they held irrigation officials  responsible. The delay on 
the part of a higher official to give instructions to issue water was aIso seen by 
farmers as an unsympathetic gesture towards them. 
Ineffectiveness  of farmer organizations.  The  farmer organizations 
formed by IMD, with leaders elected for each field channel, were supposed to 
do water management below the field-channel turnouts. Though field-channel 
leaders had been elected to a11 the field channels under Distributary Channel- 
2, Disrributary Channel-2 itself did not have a separate farmer organization. 
The field-channel leaders of  Distributary Channel-2 had been incorporated 
into a hamlet-level farmer organization formed by IMD based on a larger 
irrigation  area.  Field-channel leaders  were supposed  to disuibute water 
equally to farmers  of their field  channel, and mobilize farmers for  cleaning and 
maintenance. The fieId-channel  leaders in Disoibutary Channel-2 could not 
perform  these  functions effectively,  for  reasons  discussed  in  the  next 
chapter. The weaknesses of the organizations  and leaders are evident from the 
following observations: 
*  None of the field channets had  been  cleaned completely on the day of 
water issue.  FieId Channel4 remained uncleaned during the whole season 
while Field Channel-10 was cleaned after water issues were made. Only the 
upper  reaches of  the  other field channels hadbeencleaned while  the tail 
end remained uncleaned throughout. The total length not cleaned was 60-70 
percent. the matiunal issueof water during 
land gmpmhn, none of the $ield-cha~tnel  l&s  voiced Lhis opposition at 
meefhqp  where hrigationofficials  were present TtKy cwld  have mine to  a 
g~agrewn~withoffi~if~esubjecthadbesndiscusredatmeetings. 
Farmers  apparently  avoided discussing  this issuebecause of thecommonbelief 
that  officers would not change their plans even if requested.  This, however, 
suggests a lack of Self-confidenCe on the part of  the field-channel leaders and 
their organization. 
*  Field-channel leaders were criticized by  farmers for such things as not 
taking part in water distribution, not solving distribution problems within the 
fieldchanne1,unfairdistributionbasedon  factiod  loyalties,andexcessiveuse 
of  water by leaders themselves.  €t was evident rhat leaders, who were not 
trained properly for organizing farmers and  had no guidance for doing this, 
lacked orgadzing skills and  could not win the farmers' bust to do their work. 
Attempts to find Solutions 
Because the irrigation officials took no action to meet the farmers' demand for 
a constant  flow during  land preparation, the farmers developed  a water 
sbouldallow the ow wboplowsonapdcular  day  to  takcrnon water on that 
day  by opening his field-turnout gate completely. 'Ib  technique would not 
have waked if it were not Bssociated with this  ethic, becam  irrigating 10-18 
aliomen~sim~usly  fkomafiddchanntl  whichcan  carry  only283 liters 
pcr second  is difficult.  Tbe  farmers  of  Reld Channels 11,  12,  13,  and 15 
followed  this  and  shared  water with little Miculty; in Field Channels 11 and 
12 this was done  with the guidance of field-channel leaders while in Field 
channels  13 aod 15 it was done by  mucual agreement of the  fmm. In Field 
Channel-14 wh~tailend~dhead-endfarm~sweredividedintotwogroup$ 
based on their place of origin, the above technique was used by farmers on a 
groupbasis,thatiS, head-endfarmersshared  waterasapupondays they were 
entitled to water, while tail-end farmers  shared on their days. It was observed 
that the four tail-enders could not get enough water to irrigate their allotments 
by  using this technique, and therefore they had problems regarding water until 
two of them started getting drainage and seepage water. 
Farmers inFieldChannels 9 and 10 didnot  use  the techniqueof simulraneous 
water sharing. With the exception of one farmer out of five in Field Channel- 
9, the others were in their native village when water issues were made.  They 
came to the settlement one week  after the day of water issue to  start work, and 
were seen blocking orher farmers' field turnouts in order to  get water. With the 
exception of one allotment, the other four allotments in  Field Channel-9 were 
low lands with no problems of water retention. Therefore, farmers  under  Field 
Channel-9 did not want to follow the technique. 
The farmers in Field Channel-10 also did not follow this technique. not 
because there was no water-retention problems, but because of  the lack of 
effective leadership of  the field-channel leader.  He smed  water in his own 
field, blocking other farmers'  field turnouts for his own benefit.  This was 
despite the other farmers' wish to share water on a group basis.  They  failed, 
however, in their attempt to do so,  and  owing to the resultant shortage  of water, 
two farmers could not complete land-prcpmtion work within the time specified. 
Though  the technique of  simultaneous water sharing was not perfect, we 
observed that in the canals where it was used in its ideal form, there was not 
much conflict over water. If water was available in the field channel, and the 
farmers were bound by the  ethics associated with technique, it guaranteed a 
fair, though not perfectly equitable, distribution. If the irrigation authorities 
hrsdpotimposedarotatioDal~ucoafi~dcbannersduringtheland~~ 
period, &is whrtique  might have been  even  mom samemi& 38  Water  Management in Maha 1986-1987 
A  particular  field  condition facilitated the use  of  this  technique of 
simultaneous water sharing -- the availability of  drainage water to  tail-end 
farmers.  It may  seem  highly  improbable that  10-18 allotments could be 
irrigated from a field channel with a capacity of 28.3 liters per second by 
simultaneous water sharing, while also giving more water to those who plow 
on a particular day. It is true that distribution problems were grave on the first 
seven days after water issues began, but after a week,  most of  the tail-end 
farmers had access to drainage water, as shown in Table 8,  Thereafter,  the 
shortage of water was  a problem  of  the  head enders  cultivating  on  new 
reddish  brown  soil. 























Source: Household survey, 198611987 mnhs. 
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Therefore we should say that this technique was developed and followed in its 
ideal form by  head enders who could not retain water in their newly developed 
land. 
With  regard  to the  s&ructural  defects and unsatisfactory land leveling, 
farmers had been corresponding with ID officials and settlement  officials since 
yala  1986.  It  was evident from the official  documents that the problems 
presented by individual farmers  hadnot yetreceivedmuchattention. However, 
as a result of the representations made by dismbutary channd-level organizations, 
and continuous dialogue with fieId-level irrigation officials at distributary 
channel-level meetings and IMD  Project Committee meetings,  the irrigation 
officials had sued  work on drainagecanals,  the Distributary Channel-2 bund, 
and roads in the early part of 1987.  According to the technical assistant in 
charge, the  estimates for the construction of  broken field turnouts, other 
been sent to the Chief Resident Engineer for  his approval by March 1987. 
These incidents show  an improvement in the direction of  solving farmer 
problems. 
The LMD  Project Manager agrees that involvement of farmer organizations 
and  field-channel leaders in  water management was not satisfactory  in Distriiutary 
Channel2 because the organization is in its formative  stage. He intimated that 
some  leaders  elected by  farmers hck leadership qualities and requested 
farmers to  change the leadership by electing more suitable persons in some 
cases. He said that people will develop better leadership qualities in the long 
run.  In addition, the IMD has pIans to train field-channel leaders and  develop 
distributaty  channel-Ievel  organizations to enable  the leaders  to do construction 
in their area on contract. and  thereby take  responsibility for carrying out 
management and  maintenance tasks in their distributary channels. 
There were only temporary solutions to the distribution problemscaused by 
the defects in the main system such as  bund erosion of main and branch cand. 
Repairs and strengthening work  have been  done since, but there  are no 
guarantees that they will not erode in future. 
Finally, it is  important  that  in future, higher-level  irrigation  officials 
deIegate authority to their subordinates to enable them to operate the system in 
their absence. 
defective field turnouts, and  land leveling in the Field Channel-13 area had 
-7 As  a result of  the sev 
ri~~~csaa2arere~onfyzoTract1.  BecausedtBesca#eredrain 
channel3  were&ietodsev~~u~tforanothertwoorthree  weeks,to 
CXH~IIC~~  thc~ind-~,however,  rhericepbts  iaDiStIibUw 
die and  wither away m  the early part of  February. 
The  farmers in  Disbibutary  Channel-2  had  invested  heavily on  their 
irrigated allotments, around which their fum  life center@- They  hadbeen in 
the =dement  Since 1985, depending on food provided by  the World Food 
Program and the savings made  prior to  migration to  the settlement. During the 
period hom 1985 to  yala 1986 many of them did not have earnings other than 
an  insignificant amount from cash crops grown in their highland allotments. 
The  heavy investment on  land development  for cultivation in yala 1986 had 
reduced their savings.  Except for a few  well-to-do pple, many of  the 
Distributary Channel-2 farmers  were in debt by the end of yaks 1986. This  was 
because the yields had  been poor compared to  the  expenses,  which  were 
reported as  being around Rs  6,OOO-S,ooCror more per  allotment. The total cost 
for  land  preparation  in  maha  1986/1987  was  about  Rs 2,500-3,OOO per 
allotment for those who were cultivating for the second time.  By  the end of 
DsCember, the average investment on an  allotment for maha 1986/1987 was 
around Rs  3,500-5,500.  Since these amounts exceeded the bank loans granted 
to farmers,  borrowing money from relatives in native villages,  in some cases 
on very high inkrest, and sale and  mortgage of land in their native villages in 
order to invest in cultivation and for daily expenses, were very common. 
When the drought brought disaster, those farmers hing  in the settlement 
temporarily, only for the cuttivation pericd, left the seulement  after two or 
IF- 
.  ~Q€~37~inDistribrtEary~~,20-30w~ 
given to thein at  the beginniagttadnaw been  withdrawn on  theassmptm  *that 
back to  theit  native villages by  the  end of February. Tlterest  remained  in the 
settlement. Thepoorestamongthemweathurrgry~thcfreefoodratiw 
towards the officers  whom they believed responsible  far the crop  failure. 
The  GOV~IIIIII~~  Agent, Hambantota and ID  offis  were the  targets  of 
verbala~f~tatdngawrongdacisionatthehuurameetingtocaltivateland 
when therewasinadequate waterinther;eseruoir. Manyfarmersbelievedthat 
ID officials should  pay  Compensation for the crop failure because they believed 
it was caused by  their reducing the water level in the reservoir for n%paking  the 
spillway gates just before the commencement of the season. 
Even  those  farmers who were closely  associated with higher-level ID 
officials were  blamed. An example is the accusation dhctsd  at the president 
of the distributary-channei organization in Hamlet I1  for organizing  a religious 
function on the instructions of irrigation officials at the KataragamaTomple  to 
invoke the bbssing of  God  Katacagama (a  Hindu God  worshipped by many 
Buddhists, whose major shrine is nearby) to get rain.  Although  some officials 
say that farmers initiated this,  many farmers believed that  Department officials 
organized the ceremony to  pretend that hey  were really womd  over the fate 
of  the farmers.  The president of  the farmers’ organization was accused of 
helping the officials  in their attempt to trick fanners. 
When the farmers were short of water they searched their memories to find 
reasons. The president ofthe farmers’ organization was vehemently criticized 
and abused for encouraging irrigation officials to  breach Lassanawewa Tank, 
which they thought could have provided them with water for drinking and 
bathing. ?he officials of  the Land  Commissioner’s Department were repoached 
by some farmers for their alleged  insensitivity to  the suffering of settlers by  not 
providing them with water and ftee food rations in time. 
The IMD  also faced setbacks in its pgram  for organizing fmer grow. 
It clashed with other deparhnents in its search for solutior~~  to  the pressing 
problems of  the farmer  population in distress.  All these problems were  ..  really 
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The overall result of the drought was the large-scale abandonment of land 
by farmers in Dismbutary Channel-2 who went in search of a livelihood in their 
native villages, where they could at least fall back on their kin for help. They 
left the  settlement with  hatred  which  could have brought about a social 
upheaval if not for the powerful ideology associated with God Kataragama, 
who is treated by many,  though not all, as the one responsible for drought. 
Many farmers claimed to believe the drought was caused by the God  at the 
requestof thepoliticians towitholdrainsinorder toholdtheudagama festival 
(a village revival program initiated by  the government) as rains would have 
disrupted preparations. Other farmers suggested that the drought was created 
by the deity to punish those who ill-treated the  Hambantota natives by not 
giving them land in the settlement area. 
Conclusion: Key Water-Management Problems 
The underlying  causes of  the major issues we raise here are associated with 
problems in decision making, soil conditions in the area, and  organizational 
weaknesses.  The defects in decision making and organization are our concern 
as social scientists. The water management problems in maha 1986/87 were 
overshadowed by the drought.  But it is no more “rational”  or scientific to 
explain the severe water problems by  simply blaming the drought than by 
attributing it to God Kataragama. As the farmers argue, the decision to start the 
season  perhaps should not have been taken on the assumption of future rain, 
especially in a new system with little history to guide decisions. Some  farmers 
suggest the tragedy in Kirindi Oya might have been avoided if the extent to be 
cultivated had been decided based on the quantity of  water available in the 
reservoir, leaving room for the expansion of the cultivation area if there were 
sufficient inflow later. Perhaps this is second-guessing. 
But as the ID has  no field data on actual  water requirements forthe new lands 
in the area,  it cannot guarantee the required quantity to farmers.  Alternatives 
like constant flow during the land preparation period were not possible because 
of the scarcity of water. Thereality, however, could havebeen explainedto the 
fanners at kanna meetings without concealing it or putting the blame on the 
canal system’s limited capacity.  Farmers were apparently never adequately 
informed of the risk involved in starting cultivation with a low reservoir. 
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The impact of  lack  of farmer participation throughout the  construction 
phase of irrigation infrastructure and land development is also evident in the 
Kirindi Oya Irrigation and  Settlement Project.  The farmers’ accusations 
~egarding  the unsatisfacm  construction of fieldchannel bunds, and shwtcomings 
in the conshuction of ridges and structures by  contractors, express in themselves 
the dissatisfaction of farmers for not being allowed to participate, at least by 
making ridges in their own fields during the period of advance alienation. 
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The Organizational Setup 
bZ.lHDI  @A  ES she h@it bT@kd @CdtUd  pj&  Under thc 
IMD  program  in  sourhan sri lank&  The  servicearea of the pjectm under 
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EleCtorateinrheHambanmDi~~t.  Themaingovanment  theTissamaharama 
higation, Agricadm, m3Agmia.n Seavices.  Tfae main pro~-levddecWn- 
~gbodyiSthe~~cooadinatingcOmmitteec~bydreGavemment 
Agent, Hambolntota (Figure 2). 
The  project is in two stages of development:  Phase-I settlement  and irrigation 
infrasmctural development  activities are  nedy completed, and Phass-II 
settlement and consauction activities had not  yet begun  at the time of  this 
research.  Therefore,  the  original Organizational  setup for  settlement and 
construction activities still remains. The  activities of  the two IMD  Project 
Managers have been restricted to the formation of farmers' organizations, and 
they m  not responsible for the development of effecdve linkages  and cmpemth 
among the service agencies involved in the project.  Project management is 
thus  in a transitional stage.'The rest of this section briefly describes the project- 
Ievel  structures and roles of the  major line departments as of the period of 
research. 
.. 
The Irrigation Department 
The Chief Resident Engineer, &o  designated as  Project Manager (Irrigation), 
has  overall responsibility for operation  and  maintenance activities in tbe 
completed Wase-I area and  for construction work in  Phase-  II area (Figwe 4). 46  Organizarion For System Management 
He  reports directly  m the  Deputy  Director  (Major  Construction) of  the 
Irrigation Department (ID), Colombo. 
The Senior Irrigation Engineer (Water Management) is in charge of the 
Water Management Feedback Information Center.  At this stage two foreign 
consultants  temporarily assist the Senior Irrigation Engineer. The dutiesof the 
Senior Irrigation Engineer entail advising the Chief Resident Engineer on 
matters such as  the irrigable area,  water requirements,  and  the operation of the 
main system. 
The daily operation and maintenance of  the Right Bank,  Left Bank,  and 
Ellegala subsystems are handled by the  three  Resident Engineers of  the 
respective areas, while the Resident Engineer (Headworks) is responsible for 
head works maintenance.  In addition, the Resident Engineers in charge of the 
new areas are responsible for construction work in their areas and  the Resident 
Engineer in charge of  the old area (Ellegala) for rehabilitation work in the old 
tanks. 
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a?he position of Senior Irrigation Engineer (Water Management) was created .after mnhe  1986/ 
1987 season. 
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Each Resident Engineer has an Irrigation Engineer under him  to handle 
operation and  maintenance activities. He is assisted by technical assistants in 
his work.  The manual operation of regulators and branch canal, distributary 
channel and  turnout gates of  the field channels is done by irrigators supervised 
by work supervisors. Though there are on  average four technical assistants  and 
two work supervisors  per tract, there are more technical assistants attached to 
offices of  the resident engineers because of the ongoing constnrction in the 
Project. 
Land Commissioner’s Department 
The Project Manager (Settlement), assisted in 1986/1987 by a Deputy Project 
Manager, is responsible for settlement, community development, and welfare 
activities in the Project (Figure 5).  Colonization officers under him are in 
charge of these activities at the &act  level, and  are assisted by field instructors, 
the hamlet-level officers of this Department.  Kuttinuyuh  (@lot  leaders) are 
supposed  to be elected by farmers, but in fact some  have been appointed from 
the settlement communities  on the recommendation of field instructors (one 
leader for 25 highland allotments) to facilitate work such as food distribution 
and organizing farmers for meetings and other functions.  Prior to  the arrival 
of  the IMD officers, the Project Manager (Settlement) and his deputy at- 
tempted to form farmer organizations. At the time of our research,  the Project 
Manager (Settlement) held the position of coordinator of IMD activities. 
The Project Manager (Settlement) and his deputy are officers of  the Sri 
Lanka  Administrative Service. They are  Assistant Commissioners in the Land 
Commissioner’s Department. The  Project Manager (Settlement) has also  been 
delegated the authority of an  Additional Government Agent (Land) to deal with 
land acquisition and relevant matters in both Hambantota and Moneragah 
Districts under which the project area falls. 
The infmtructural development in hamlets and towns under the Project 
area is handled by theLand Cornmissioner’s Department. These activities  are 
done under  the supervision of a deputy commissioner at the Department 
headquarters. B 
‘! 
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The Department  of Agriculture performs three functions at the project level, 
through three  wings: extension, training and education, and research. The 
Assistant Director (Agriculture) in charge of Hambanma District attends the 
Project Coordinating  Committee meetings along with the Agricultural Officer 
.@xtension)  in  charge of the Tissamaharama am.  The Agrkdd  Officer  is 
in charge of extension work both within and outside the pject  area, as  shown 
in Figure 6. He is assisted by  three  Speciatist officers  in rice, other food crops, 
and plant protection. There are  five Agricultural Inst$wma  Divisions in the 
Tissamaharama area.  The  agricultural extension wa&@  these divisions is 
handled by five Aghltural Wmctors, assisted by &&@  viyaplhi sevakas 
SVS),  the grass-roots level offm  of the Depovtment. 
’  Agricultural Instructor. 
’  Old area includes land under Ellegah and  Badagiriya system and mall tank areas 
under the Deparanent of  Agrarian Services. and encroached hd  ereas. 
Kmhi  Viyapthi Sevaka. 
The  major functions of the extension service are to  give appropiate training 
to farmers, collect  fieid dataon agriculturalactivities  such  as  seed requirements 
and extent cultivated, and give field insmaions regarding applicah of 
fertilizer, weedicides and  pesticides. 
There is a training center in Weerawila New Town  to  give special training 
to farmers in agriculture.  It is under the charge of a aaining &ier  dirtcay 
under  the  supervision of  the  Assistant Director (Training and Education) 
attached to the Angunukolapalessa Agicdtural Training Cenae.  Bemuse of 
the lack of facilities such as  water, tbe  Wmwila  Training Cenm  is not yet 
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A research officer has been appointed to the Adaptative Research Centre in 
Weerawila New  Town.  He is under the supervision of the Assistant Director 
(Research) in AngunukoIapalessa  Agricultural Research Centre.  Because of 
scarcity of water and lack of other facilities, research activities have not yet 
begun. 
Department of Agrarian Services 
The Assistant Commissioner (Agrarian Services)  represents the Department of 
Agrarian Services at meetings of  the Project Coordinating Committee.  The 
Tissamaharama  area, which includes both the new and old areas of the project, 
falls under the Agrarian Services divisions of  Beralihela, Weerawila, and 
Badagiriya. Therefore, the Divisional Officers have responsibilities  within and 
outside the project area. Cultivation Officers are the Iowest-level officers of 
this Department (Figure 7). 
Figure 7. Project-level smcture of the Department of  Agrarian Services. 
Assistant Commissioner (Agrarian services), Hambantota 
I 
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The functions  of the Department of  Agrarian Services  include, maintaining 
of small tanks;  hblding kanna meetings for such tanks: issuing farmers' identity 
cards; collecting acreage fees from farmers; supplying agricultural inputs such 
as weedicide, insecticide,  and fertilizer to farmers; estimating  damage to crops 
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by  cattle; assisting the Agricdturql Insurance €30ard to estimate crop failures; 
settling disputes beween landlords and tenants; instructing fanners for  cleaning 
and fencing of  field channels; and enforcing the provisions of the Agrarian 
Services Act. 
Irrigation Management Division 
Two  project managers had been appointed by the Division to Kirindi Oya just 
prior to the commencement of  yala in 1986. One project manager is in charge 
of the old areas under the Badagiriya and Ellegala systems and the other is in 
charge of the new areas under the right and left banks. 
The IMD Project Managers are  responsible for coordination of activities of 
the various agricultural and inigation agencies.  The  Project Managers are, 
however, presentIy restricted to forming farmer organhtions because of  the 
domination of  other organizations at this particular stage of  the development 
of  the project.  We  observed some  tension towards the officers of  the IMD 
because some project officials see  the IMD as an intruder. 
Despite some obstacles, the IMD Project Manager for the new areas was 
abIe to farm a project committee in November 1986, though with little support 
from some of the other agencies (Figure 8). The Project Committee meetings 
are chaired by  the IMD  Project Manager.  The members of  the committee are 
representatives from distributary-channel organizations, Technical Assistants 
of  the  ID,  Divisional Officers of  the Department  of  Agrarian  Services, 
Colonization Officers of  the Land  Commissioner's  Department, and the 
Agricultural Instructor of the Department of Agriculture.  Though irrigation 
engineersarenotmembersof the committeetheyattendmeetingsasobservers. 
The number of farmer representatives on the committee was seven at this 
stage because farmer organizations  had  not  been  well  organized  on  all 
distributary channels. The officers of the organization attending meetings and 
carrying out duties established  by the IMD are paid an allowance  of Rs  250 per 
month.  The duties of the members include: 
1.  to assist the IMD Project Manager to prepare, and implement the 
agricultural program; 5.  to  emurage farmen to develop a proper water management system 
(farm level); 
Project Manager QhQ) - President  I 
I 
7.  to prepare estimates for construction when necessary. 
FCgroup  FCGroupl  IFCGroup 
Figure 8.  The IMD hject  Committee. 
2 
Farmer Represmtativcr  Colonization  Agricult~d  Divisional  Tcchnid 
(oncfmeach  OHictrrfromeach  Instrucronr  officw  Assistants 
distributary channel-  tract in new luca  (wokhg in  (3 from Right Bank 
level organization)  new anal  md2 from Left Bd)  E  I 
(Lmd Commissionds CDtpartment of  (Departmatt of  (Irrigation 
Deputmcnt)  Agricutture)  AgrorianserVices)  Department) 
Notes: 
1.  The Secre.twy ii  tlecrtd fran  among Ihe govemmau official manben. 
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In addition to  these duties and responsibilities they should reside in  the 
Project area, forward their advance program to the IMD  Pmject Manager, and 
do  at least two mp  surveys per season, to be eligible to  claim the allowmce. 
Farmer Organizations under the IMD 
Field-channel groups  Consist of  the legal dottees under a parkuhr field 
channel.  They  are informal groups. with leaders chosen by the fanners by 
mutualagreement(cmsews). Thefield-channell-~~~m 
-- under a  distributary anal  form a distributarychannel  organization, which is 
a formal fmer organization, though with no  legal basis (PigUte 9). At the 
preliminary stage  it is established with  the guidance of  the IMD  Project 
Manager.  The  secretary, president, treasum, and other office bearers  are 
elected by the  fanner respresentatives.  In  addition, divisional field-level 
offiers attend meetings as associate members. Either the  president or the 
secretary of the dishihtarychanne1 organization can  repiesent the  organization 
at the Project Committee. 
Figure 9. Structure of fanners’ organizations. 
1 Distributary-level farmer organizations  f 
Weld channel. Y 
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agricultural program, and participation in  and organization of  other socb 
cultural functions tending  to promote links between the farming and non- 
farming population. 
COMMUNICATION  WITHIN AGENCIES 
Communication within the agencies is officially through formal meetings and 
correspondence within a hierarchical setup, At monthly meetings or special 
meetings headed by higher-level project officers, matters relevant to program- 
ing, planning, or implementation of  theagency’sprojectactivities  are commu- 
nicated to field-level officers. When higher  officials  needinfomation on field 
conditions, reports are requested from field-level officers.  In addition, the 
higher-level officials  give instructions to their subordinate  fieldofficers  during 
routine visits to field sites. 
The Land Commissioner’s Department held such meetings, headed by the 
Project Manager.  The Agricultural Instructors  of the Department of Agriculture 
and Divisional Officers of the  Department of  Agrarian Services also held 
weekly meetings with their field  officers. Inaddition,monthlyprogressreports 
were called from theofficers. These  meetings,  correspondence, andreports  are 
important media of communication within these agencies. 
The ID, however, heldno such formal meetings with its field staffduring  the 
season of research. Though there were reports and  correspondence among  the 
officials, personal (individual) meetings of higher officials with field staff or 
vice-versa was the primary method of communication observed among the 
irrigation officials.  Though personal meetings have important functions, we 
observed that reliance on  these led to many officers not being aware of or 
accurate about day-to-day operational problems.  The usefulness of  formal 
meetings for information exchange was observed on two occasions described 
below. 
An irrigation engineer, addressing the Project Committee meeting on  27 
November 1986, rtssured farmer representatives and others that although the 
water level in  the  reservoir was low, the quantity was  sufficient if  used 
economically. In addition, he remarked that there was a good  inflow  too. 
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Subsequent events showed  these  assurances to  be incorrect.  An  officer 
responsible for operation and maintenance in the right-bank area was apparently 
not aware of  the reality of a low reservoir. The other example is  the different 
views on the quantity of the water released for the repair of the spillway gate. 
The Chief Resident Engineer said it was 7,000 acre-feet (8.64  MCM),  but 
according to one resident engineer, the quantity released was much  more -- 
complete reduction to dead Ievel. This engineer’s information was apparently 
incorrect. 
We  also observed hat technical  assistants in charge of  operation and 
maintenance were often not aware of actual field conditions. For example, the 
technical assistant in charge of  the  Distributary Channel-2 area was not. 
informed about the scarcity of water on Field Channel-  13. We know  of at least 
10 occasions  when fanners  had to meet the technical assistant personally at his 
office to complain because the irrigator and work supervisor had not told him 
of  their water problems. 
INTERAGENCY COMMUNICATION, COOPERATION,  AND 
CONFLICT 
Communication among  Agencies 
In  addition  to  routine  correspondence among  the  departments, the  most 
effectivecommunicationmethodwasmonthlymeetingsoftheprojectoffici~s. 
The Project Coordinating Committee  chaired by the Government Agent, and 
the Project Committee chajred by the IMD  Project Manager, were the most 
important in this respect. The Project Coordinating Committee discusses 
issues relating to settlement, infrastructural development, commencement of 
the cultivation season, and other project development activities; but agricultural 
planning for the season  or operational problems of the irrigation system are  not 
addressed in detail at these meetings.  The decisions taken at these meetings are 
communicated to divisional and field-level officers by district- and pruject- 
level officers attending the meeting. At the Project Committee meetings, division-level osm  of line agencies 
meet farmer representatives  to discuss issues  relevant to agricultural pluming, 
water issues, and related activities  for agriculanal development. This Project 
Committee was formed in November 1986, after the Cammemcement of maha 
19W1987.  -Hence, it could not contribute much  to  seasonal agricultural 
planning. The commiuee however, attempted  OD solve some waterdistribution 
prabhs. Itcantributedmachtobuildiagmutual~~~~amoagthefarmer 
representafives  and  officials in order to solve farmer problems. Some farmer 
repl.esentatives claimed  that 50 percent of irrigatiosl problems were solved 
through the mediation of the IMD  Project Committee. Solving some serious 
problms, however, required the assistance of higher-level officials. Though 
decisionsoftheAojectcommitteew~~~totheprojact~ 
Committee, this comminee did not address them.  These  pblems  were also 
not discussed at the District Agriculturd Committee. 
Cooperation and Conflict Among Agencies 
The field-level officers of other agencies had little contact with official  of the 
ID, and they were rarely seen at each other's offices other  than for formal 
meetings where participation was obligatory. Though we do not know much 
about  the relationships  among the higher-level  project officials of line  agencies, 
we  can say that most of the divisional and field-level officers had no intimate 
relations with the ID. 
We constantly heard criticism that irrigation officials were carrying out 
contract construction work. The main reason for these accusations was that 
when farmers reported  irrigation problems to field-level settlement officials, 
with whom they have close relations as settlers, it would be reported to the 
respective  resident engineer for solution. But the  idgation officials preferred 
to channel requests through their respective heads  according to administrative 
regulations. The colonization officials and field instructors were not satisfied 
with these arrangements because they took a long time to get results. Hence, 
the outcome was severe criticism. 
The other major conflict, of which most officials and  farmers were aware, 
was the tension between the Project Manager (Settlement) and the newly 
appointed MD  Project Managers.  Some colonization officers even claimed 
P 
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theyhad~instructednottoassisttheIMDProjectManagerinhiswol.lr.  We 
do notknow if this claim is correct, but theProjsct Manager clearly  had to make 
a great effort to orgh  farmers'  groups with  little help MWy  from the 
colonization officers until he had won their confidence There  are a number of 
incidents in our notes that support this statement, which need  not be  recounted 
here. The important fact is that this tension  between  the two departments of the 
same ministry has had asenous  impact on  the development of effective scheme 
management, and is an issue that needs to  be  addressed in future. 
DISTRIBUTARY-CHANNEL  ORGANIZATIONS 
Though there are a number of  organizations such as Buddhist associatiom, 
wal development sccieties, school development  societies, and  political societies 
in Hamlet 11, the only farmer organization based on the irrigation area is the 
Distributary Channel-2 organization formed under the guidance of the  Project 
Manager.  This  organization was formed in July 1986, some  time after water 
issues for  yala 1986, the first season  in the scheme. Before  the  formation of this 
organization, field-channel leaders  had been selected  by  farmers  on the day of 
the kanna meeting,  with the guidance of the IMD Project Manager. TheProject 
Manager says he had regular  monthly meetings with field-channel leaders, to 
train them to act independently on their own initiative. He presided over the 
field-channel leaders' meetings during this period, and  the technical assistant 
in charge of  the area was supposed to act as  secretary of the organization. 
However, the  Technical Assistant is said not to have attended the meeting 
regularly, though he came to meetings on  important occasions  on the invitation 
of the Project Manager, acmrding to fanners. 
The  members of the distributarychannel organhation membership included 
all leaders of field channels where Hamlet 11 residents have allotments.  As 
shown in Figure 10, the irrigation area under the organization was not confined 
to a single dishibutary channel Membership was extended to leaders of  direct 
fieldchannelsfkomtheright-bankm~ncanal,BranchCanal-2~anddisPibutruy 
channels, in  order to  in-  all the field-channel leaders miding in 
Hamlet 11 into this distributary-channel organization. 58  Organization For System Management 
ButFigure 1Oaisoshowsthatthereweresomeanomaliesresultingfrom  this 
approach to  membership.  Some field channels under  Distributary Channels 3, 
7, and  8 and two direct field channels, 5 and  6, were excludedbecause  farmers 
under hem are from Hamlets 8 and 10, though  other field channelson the same 
distributary  channels,  and adjacent direct field cbeIs,  were included. 
Attempts were made to include the leaders of Field Channels 5 and 6 in the 
Hamlet 1  1  distributary-channel organization, but they never  came to meetings 
because  they live in Hamlet 8, nearly 5  km from Hamlet 11. In addition, they 
were Muslims, whose mother tongue was Tamil, while almost everybody in 
Hamlet 11 was Sinhalese. 
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In  Distributary Channels 3. 7, and  8, alloments under  different field 
channels are owned by  farmers in Hamlets 11,8,  and 10. The field-channel 
leaders of other hamlets could not be  brought into the Hamlet 11 disaibutaq- 
channel organization, but field-channel leaders under those cads  residing 
in Hamlet  11 were  incorporated into  the  hiet  11 distributarychannel 
organization. 
TheIMDHandbook~1985)mhs~m~in~ 
adjacent direct field channels into the dishbutary-channel organization, but 
incorporation of  selected field channels under different distributary channels 
into one disnibutary-channel Organization does  not lead to a cohesive dkihtary 
channel organization. The main problem facing the IMD at this stage is to 
bring fanners of  different hamlets but sharing water brn  a common distributary 
channel into a common distributary-channel organization.  But  since the 
hamlets are located five to six km away from one another,  bringing the settlers 
of these hamlets together for meetings and other activities is difficult.  This  is 
why theIh4D had organized thedistributarychannel  organization in Hamlet 11 
based on field-channel groups living in the same hamlet. 
As Figure 10 shows, the main distributary channel on  which the Hamlet 11 
distributary-channel organization is based is Distributary Channel-2; all  of its 
87 allotments have been allocated to settlers in Hamlet t 1. None of the leaders 
of its seven fieldchannels, however, holds aresponsible post in thedistributary- 
channel organization.  The  president,  secretary,  and treasurer are leaders of 
Field Channels 1,2, and 3, which are direct field channels from the right-bank 
main canal.  Hence the problems of fanners under Distributary Channel-2 did 
not receive much attention unless individual farmers brought them to the notice 
of  the  leaders.  On one occasion, we  accompanied the president of  the 
distributary-channelorganization  to Distributary Channel-2to  find out whether 
he was aware offmers’  problems there. We  discovered that he did not how 
anything about problems of  Distributary Channel-2.  As a result of  its not 
paying much attention to their problems, the Disuibutary Channel-2 came to 
perceive the distributary-channel organization as a bureaucratic organization, 
and  they had little trust in its leadership. This situation was aggravated by the 
fact that the field-channel leaders under Distributary ChanneI-2 were not very 
active at this stage. 
The inactivity of  field-channel Ieaders  was primarily a result of  their 
unsettled state in the settlement. Though they had come to the settlement in 
1985 and were permanently settled there, they had, however,to return to their 60  Organizatwn  ROT  System Munagement 
native villages occasionally in search of  money and  help fmm  theirrelativC~. 
This was  necessary because they  had no employment #ties  in the 
project area.  Some members of  their families, particnlarly childrea  in 
secondary school, also stayed in their native daga  becsose schools in the 
project~werenotyetfunctioaingpmperlyorhadclasses~y  hrprimary- 
gradestubts. Hence,~swasa~hnalstagedurhgwhkh~dd 
not pay much attention to  forming  an  Organization. 
meetings  was very poor.  The numb  attending any meeting never exceeded 
12, though there were 22 field-channel leaders in the argmhtion. Of the 
seven field-channel leaders in Dishibutary Channel-2,  only three were seen 
regularly at Disaibutary Channel-2 meetings. When &ed  why  they were 
absent, they usually claimed they were absent from Hamlet 11 on  the particular 
day. Even the  secretary was absent from three  consecutive meetings. He had 
mortgaged his hd  in maha 1986/87, was rarely in Hamlet 11, and had not 
brought  his  family to the  settlement.  There  were accusations from  the 
members of the organization against the secretary for  not informing them of  the 
meetings on  time.  On  one occasion the secretafy had to apologize for not 
informing the members of  the meeting day. 
N~~~the~tnorthe~~of~~~~~~otgemizaaion 
was popular among  the farmers and field-channel leaders. The secretary,  behg 
an  Ayurvedic physician, did not move much with fanners and  was not seen  in 
their company.  He felt that if a farmer has problems he should contact him 
directly or through the respective field-channel leader. His  behavior was that 
of  an indigenous Vedamahuzhthaya (doctor), who expected the patients to 
come to him,  Hence, the field-channel leaders and farmers considered him 
arrogantbecause,though aVedamahaththayain  hisownvillage,theprescriM 
role for him in the new village was that of a leader of the dism3utary-channel 
organization. 
The  president of the organization had previously been  an overseer in the 
Department of Agriculture. He was very populw in the beginning because he 
criticized officials at kanna  and  pre-kanna meetings. But when he became  the 
president of  the organization he is alleged to have changed a lot and  started 
praising itrigation officials.  The farmers and  field-channel leaders who saw 
this change believed that irrigation officials had won him over to  tbeir side. 
During the drought he organized the  religions ceremony at the  Katamgama 
temple, mentimed above,  to  get rain.  on  the advice of  bi@on  officials and 
Tlle-afthefieddcbannel  warmcharmel- 
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without consulting bdistrihtary~b~l  organization. Most ofthe farmers, 
who believed that be  Scarcity of water had resulted from reducing the  water 
level in the  reservoir,  took this as  an  attempt by  ID oMcials to “aick”  them. 
Hence,  the president was vehemently Criticized for taking part in this charade. 
Even the field-channel leaders  had little influence over the farmers under 
their field channels.  Ninety-five pen’Rnt of the land under thest: two fieXd 
channels is owned by people from one age,  NaraweJpk, in the Hafrmana 
E!lecmte. Of the seven  field-chd  leaders in Distn’butary Channel-2, only 
MO  participated in water distribution. Both leaders are from the  same  age 
and  in addition dl of them are of one caste. Because of this and also their high 
educational level -- one holds a BA  degree and  the other is GCE  (AIL) -- they 
In the case of Field Channel-9, the leader never  came  to distributary- 
channel meetings, and was not in Hamlet 11 und  after  water issues  began. The 
lea&  in Field Channel-10 had quarrels with a tail-end farmer  under his canal. 
According to fanners in Field Channel-10, he stored water selfishly  in his 
allotment without much  consideration for others.  His was the alloment in 
Field Channel-10 to be  cultivated first in the season.  The leader of Field 
Channel-13 was reluctant to  go  to  meet technical assistants and offids  to 
inform them of  the irrigation problems of  farmers, so he was not popular. 
Another settler had to go on his behalf to meet officials. 
The leader of Field Channel-14 attended distributary-channel  organization 
meetings regularly and tried to introduce a rotation on  his field channel in maha 
19841’1987.  Head-end farmers opposed  the rotation.  However, the field- 
channel leader, who was a tail ender himself, aied to implement the rotation 
at the beginning of  water issues without listening to  the head enders. Most of 
the head enders are from Deniyaya while the tail enders are from Hakmana. 
Therefore, the attempt to introduce a rotation was seen by  most head endem as 
taking  the side of settlers from Hakmana. When we inquired from a head-end 
farmer of Field Channel-13 whether the field-channel leader distributes  water 
equally, he replied that the “leader goes mad when he sees  water flowing in the 
field channel.’’  Analyzing the meaning of  this statement,  the farmer had 
clearly referred to the caste status of the leader -- a dhobi (washerman) waiting 
anxiously till fresh water comes to wash dirty clothes. 
On Field Channel-15, though the leader was not influential. the foumers, 
being from a neighboring village and of  the same caste,  had M)  difficulty 
sharing  water. The laad  under this  canal  was cultivated for the frrst time in 
oouldinfluencetheircommunitytoachievethecanmon~dwater~~~. 62  Organizution For System Management 
maha 1986/1987, and the leader was only temporarily in the settlement, so he 
did not contribute much to the formation of the field-channel group. 
While the participation of field-channel leaders was  not satisfactory for the 
reasons discussed above, the participation of the officials at such meetings in 
terns  of IMD  guidelines  was even more unsatisfactory. Divisional Officers of 
the  Department of  Agrarian  Services and  Agricultural Instructors of  the 
Deparlment of Agriculture never attended meetings of the distributary-channel 
organization.  When  farmers had  seriow  irrigation problems, the (DID) 
Project Manager had to go personally to the Resident Engineer (Rjght Bank) 
to bring the relevant technical assistant to the meeting.  The  IMD  Project 
Manager had no assistants to help him in his work he had to do everything, 
such  as  mee6ng leaders of  field- and distributary-channel organizrrtiOns, 
himself.  When we asked the Resident Engineer (Right  Bank)  why his officers 
did not participate in IMD meetings regularly he claimed that instructions  had 
been given to officers regarding their participation and  he had no complaints 
from IMD.  The IMD Project Manager felt that complaining would not be an 
encouragement for participation. 
As a result of  the lack of  participation by field-channel leaders 85 well as 
organization in which almost everything is done by corresponding witb the 
relevant agencies.  Even those problems which could be  solved within the 
distributary-channel organization  are brought  to JMD  Project Committee 
meetings. This setup  is not conducive for the formation of self-reliant  farmers’ 
groups because it tends to promote in them a feeling that there is somebody 
above them to solve their problems. 
officials in the dishib~*hannel  orgmaim  ,  it &generatea  into  8 bureaucmtic 
CONCLUSION: KEY  ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS 
Organizational Problems Related to Water Management 
The main agencies  involved in water management  are  the ID and the IMD. The 
officials of  the ID aied to implement a rotation down to the field-channel 
turnout, without considering the practical problems of  the  farmers  in irrigating 
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their allotments. Water management in field channels was  supposed  to be done 
under the guidance of field-channel leaders, but was often left in the hands of 
farmers since  the Ieaders had not yet estabIished themselves in their communities. 
Though  technical assistants made regular visits to the field to  instruct 
irrigators and work supervisors, they didnot have the necessary feedback from 
the field staff to understand the practical problems of  farmers. The purpose of 
their field visits was to give instructions regarding canal operation. The only 
place where they could get information was the distributary4annel organhation 
meeting,  which the technical assismts did not attendregularly. Therefore, the 
resident engineer also did not have the  necessary feedback from the field 
regarding farmers’ irrigation problems. 
Individual farmers  and the distributary-channel organization corresponded 
with the Resident Engineer (Right Bank)  but the onIy solution offered  was  the 
suggestion that they follow the water-issue timetable, which many farmers felt 
was not practical. If the officials of the ID had  tried to understand the farmers’ 
difficulties  by communicating  with them,  rather than  impIernenting the rotation 
in a mechanical way, a more amicable solution could have been  arrived at to 
the satisfaction of both parties. 
The lack of communication  between farmers and  them  was observedon  the 
.  days  when canal bund erosion led to scarcity of  water.  None of the farmers in 
Distributary Channel-2 knew the reason for the scarcity on some days. If the 
Department had informed them of the canal erosion, farmers might not have 
panicked and could have adjusted their land preparation work. 
The Resident Engineer (Right Bank) told  us that though  he  had given 
instructions  to  the  technicd  assistants  to  participate in meetings of  the 
distributary-channel organization, they were reluctant to  do so.  This was 
mainly a result of their attitude towards fanners as people who are waiting for 
the government to assist them, then  using the meeting as an opportunity to 
criticize the officials. 
The problems regarding on-farm water management occurred mainly as a 
result of lack of guidance to field-channel leaders. The IMD Project Manager 
could not establish organizations and  h-ain leaders in such a large  area without 
assistance.  He had no support since institutional  organizers had not yet been 
appointed.  The only staff potentially available for such organizaEional activities 
was that of  the Land Commissioner’s Department, but the conflicts between 
the two departments precluded their participation. -pioMems  Reiatingto Harming 
Farmers' Problems 
In  Chapter  2, we discussed in detail the farmers' problems regarding higation 
water.  Here we address other problems confronting the settlers. 
Disputesover  allobnentboundariesareama~rprobIemin  theRoject This 
is  mainly because the settlers were shown their allotments when they were still 
jungle, and in  the  process of land development the boundary markers have 
disappeared. Farmer representatives raised these problems  at the IMD Project 
Committeeand they havebeendirectedtotheProject  C~~ating  Commiaee. 
Tk  drainage  canals to  be  constructed by farmers also  got delayed because of 
thisprobIem,leadingtolanddisputesamongsettleasaswellasbetween  settlers 
and  the government, 
Lgoddisplltesbetw~noriginal~ersand~weredi~ussedin 
meetingsoftgePrqject  WbYfW=tEpkW3M *v@.  Though we  I 
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Potential Solutions Suggested by Farmers and Of€lcers 
The farmers  had a very negative attitude towards the  Project.  Many  had 
developed a peat dislike for certain  officials, whom  they suggested should be 
transferred.  One prominent fanner leader, when told fanners could  not have 
representatives  in the Project Coordinating  Committee, said 
I worked €or this government and was an ardent supporter of it, but was 
refused [permission] to  participate in the meeting on  behalf of fbners. 
We can't do anything with  these officials. I feel I am wrong and the JW 
(Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, a Marxist political group which remains 
outside the mainstream of Sri  Lankan politics) boys  arecorrect. niey  say 
that nothing can be done under  this setup.  It is too  late now. otherwise 
I myself would have been a JW  member. 66  Organization For System Management 
An official of the ID viewed the problems as having occurred as a result of 
farmers’ lack of experiencein a major irrigation scheme, in which they should 
cultivate according to a cropping calendar, follow water-issue timetables, and 
develop other behavior patterns demanded by the system. His  solution was the 
formation of  active farmer organizations which facilitate the work of  the ID. 
The IMD Project Manager suggests that an  effective subcommittee of the 
District Agricultural Committee, with farmer representatives incliided, should 
be formed in order to coordinate agricultural planning and implementation at 
the project level.  This is necessary because the Project Coordinating Committee, 
formed mainly for construction and  infrasrructural development activities, is 
not appropriate for coordinating agricultural activities. 
It seems  clear to us  that although these officials’ suggestions merit serious 
attention, they would be  inadequate as solutions to the problems identified in 




THIS  PAPER HAS  described and analyzed irrigation behavior patterns on one 
distributary in the  Kirindi Oya Irrigation and Settlement Project, and  the 
impact  on this behavior of higher levels of management,  during one cultivation 
season. The season began as  a “normal” maha; though the reservoir was  low, 
rains were expected to augment the supply.  During the early stages of  the 
season,  the farmers faced a number of difficulties,  including an unreliable and 
unpredictable supply of water, at times an apparently inadequate supply, and 
serious distribution  probIems which had several causes. These problems were 
not abnormal for a new scheme, in which farmers  were irrigating for only their 
frstor second seaSon. Fanners  on some field channels did develop an informal 
method of  sharing  water that was contrary to the rotation recommended by the 
Irrigation Deparunent (ID), called samanawa bedaganima, equal or simultaneous 
sharing. 
On the other hand, the inabiIity of the newly formed farmers’  organizations 
on the field- and distributary-channel (hamlet) levels either to solve farmers’ 
water problems, or to represent farmers’ interests  effectively, was also revealed 
at this stage. The problems included conflict over water among  fanners, poor 
maintenance of field channels by farmers,  inequitable water distribution,  and 
poor  comunicatiOn between the leaders  and other farmers. These  organizational 
weaknesses may be attributed in part to the novelty of the organizations, lack 
of  experience of farmers with cultivation on large irrigation schemes, lack of 
adequate resources for promoting and saengthening the organizations, and 
inadequate support of the organizations from other departments. 
The effect of the drought -- crop failure -- further weakened the farmers’ 
organizations,  leading lo criticism and  rejection of some  of the leaders,  and  loss 
of  faith in the organizations and,  most importantly, in many of  the project 
officials.  The poverty and  helplessness of most settlers was very serious; the 
pple  were auly in distress. 
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and  th&  imwt  011 th  farmers  ia DiSMbttW chen~l-2.  Coopeaation  and 
communication among the vsrious ag&  involved in  the  Project were 
&own  a0  be  inadequate, as  was the wmmanication and cooperation between 
some of  the agencies  rhe farmas.  2he ID  attempted to implement a 
rorationplan$luuwaanatexpbdwd  adegrrately to fanners, anddid not appear 
Dteds at ske  field kwel, but there was  nomet.hanism for 
offarmers' viewsandprublem. TbeWject4bdhfhg 
Committee mi$mUy  set tip to  caxdhate cmstruch activities proved 
hEecthe€ormg  system-operation  pblms.  TheProject Committee 
of  the Irrigation Management Division (IMD) did not have sufficient support 
at high levels, and was weakened further by interagency rivalries, and  lack of 
authority, This fragmentation of  authority,  and  even competition for  authority, 
at the  project levei was at  the mot of  the  water  distribution  and supply 
problems, and contributed to  the ineffectiveness of the farmers' organhhns 
as well. 
The authorities were forced to recognize the drought condition when the 
reservoir emptied.  The drought put further slfess on both the farmers' and 
government organizations, which were unable to respond effectively to the 
drought conditions. The previous failure of offichls to inform farmers of the 
implications of the repairs to  the spill gates, and the risks of  starting a season 
with a reservoir below the minimum level required  by the des  of the ID, now 
led to farmers and even some officials blaming the ID for the drought; the 
irrigation officials' well-meaning attempt to organize  a religious ceremony 
further exacerbated these feelings. 
In the future,  the Kirindi @a  Irrigation and Se~ement  Project is expected 
to be water-short in some  seasons,  especially during yala.  In order to use the 
water productively, prtididy  if crop  divedialion  is sUCCeSSfuUy impkme& 
very  strong and effective organizations for system management  will  be 
required at  levels. It is unfortunate that as is often the  case  in nkP; irrigation 
schemes in many counaies, too little attention has been paid to institution- 
building at the earlier  stages of the Project We 
toChangingthis,andlead to  in;reased attention  t?3 
organizatim. The  research presently being c 
S 
*  The terms  of  reference  of the existing Project Coo3dinating Committee 
shouldbecanfioedto~  ofgovemmentapienciesfarconsauction 
work in the Phase-1I area. 
*  ThepresentIMDProject Committee  shouldbedevelopedhtoa"EGrhdi 
Oya Project Management Committee," with high-level officials from 
key  government  and  semi-government  agencies  and  farmers' 
representatives. This Committee should be the vehicle for setting overaU 
operational policies for the project and  for the irrigation system,  and be 
a forum for discussing important system management problems,  and 
coming to agreed-upon solutions. In the short  run  perhaps it could be an 
advisory and coordinating comnlittee; bur in the longer run  it should be 
given considerable responsibility and authority for system management 
policies.  Given  the problems of  status  among presentproject-level 
officials, this  Committee should  be chaired by  the overall Project 
Manager proposed  above. Alternatively, if the present setup is retained, 
itwouldbebestifthe GovernmentAgent (X-Iambantota) weretochair  this 
Committee, with one ofthe  IMD Project  Managers  as its  secretary,  with 
coordinating authority. 
*  Within the ID --  the key Departmeniin the whole Project sewp -- it would 
be useful if construction (Phase 11)  and  operationd responsibilities could 
be  separated. To be effective, it would be  important to provide  some 
additional  incentives to  those  oficials assigned  to  oprations.  In 
addition, the ID should make a dear and unequivocal commitment  to 70  ConcIusion 
establishing effective relationships with farmers’ organizations, and to 
promoting actively two-way communication and cooperation between 
fanners and  the ID.  To make this effective, these tasks would have to 
be  written into the job descriptions of  the technical assistants,  irfigation 
engineers, and resident engineers: monitoring of  their job performance 
should  include these parameters;  and they  should be  givenspecial 
training to improve their communication and management skills. This 
applies to higher-level officials as well.  We strongly recommend that 
the ID encourage holding regular staff meetings at the various levels 
of management, 
*  If, as we assume,theMinistry  is serious about developing strong farmers’ 
organizations as an integral component of  the overall management 
structure,  the basic concept and approach of  the IMD may need rethinking. 
We reserve comment on this until further research is completed.  If the 
present IMD  approach is retained, its management should be strengthened. 
Specifically,  we suggest  that senior IMD  officials from Colombo  should 
regularly participate in meetings of the Project Coordinating Committee 
(as do higher-level officials of  the Land Commissioner’s Department, 
forexample), In  addition, the  senior officials should provide more 
effective guidance and support to the IMD Project Managers, through 
more frequent visits, consultations, and training as needed. 
*  Finally, we note that since this study was completed, the resources for 
promoting and strengthening farmers’ organizations have been increased. 
However, we  are not  confident,  based on more recent research, that 
the institutional  organizers presently deployed are effective. We suggest 
the  Ministry  might  experiment with  using existing field-level staff, 
particularly field instructors of the Land Commissioner’s Department, 
for organizing farmers’ organizations. The field instructors  would need 
special training, and  would need to be guided and monitored carefully, 
but  we believe they could do the job effectively. This may require re 
assigning some of theseofficials  to the Irrigation Management Division, 
to  be  supervised by  the  IMD Project Managers.  We also  suggest 
rectifying theanomdiescreated  by organizingdis~butary  organizations 
by  hamlera distributary-channel organization is likely  to  be  most 
effective if it is clearly based on a common water source. 
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Successful development of a major irrigated settlement scheme  like Kirindi 
Oyais  a very complex and time-consumingprocess. Itcouldbeargued  that one 
source of difficulties on older settlement schemes is that insufficient  attention 
was paid to developing adequate management institutions at all levels, including 
among farmers.  Being a new  scheme, the Kirindi Oya Project offers an 
opportunity to avoid these problems by  developing effective  institutions  from 
thebeginning.  If this paper contributes to initiating this process, it will have 
achieved its objective. References 
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